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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three chapters studying topics in development economics
and political economy. The first two chapters explore the political economy of drought
relief in India and potential consequences for local economies. The third chapter
focuses on the effect of the residential segregation of the South Asian community on
the political views of natives in England and Wales.
In the first chapter, I study the allocation of drought relief in three states of south-
ern India between 2008 and 2019. I compare the observed allocation against the
national government’s guidelines for drought relief and show that state governments
systematically deviate from these guidelines. To assess the potential role of political
motives in this mistargeting, I develop a dynamic probabilistic voting model. The
model provides testable implications relating electoral incentives to the allocation of
relief, which I show hold empirically.
In the second chapter, I consider the potential impacts of receiving drought relief
on agricultural output at the local level. Using a satellite-based vegetation index
as a proxy for agricultural production, I find that drought relief is associated with
increased agricultural output. However, I also show that this positive correlation is
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strongest when relief is appropriately allocated to drought-affected areas. I consider
a number of alternative explanations for these results, but conclude that the results
are consistent with drought relief being more effective in drought-affected areas.
In the third chapter (joint with Sergio Villar Vallenas), we study how the size and
spatial distribution of South Asians influences the sentiments of natives towards the
group in England and Wales. We use voting for the British National Party (BNP), an
extreme right political party, to measure natives’ sentiment. One obstacle to causally
identifying the effect of segregation on the voting for the BNP is that the antipathy
for South Asians reflected in BNP support might lead to segregation. To address
this concern, we isolate variation in the settlement patterns of South Asians using
historical immigration patterns. We find that a rise in the residential segregation of
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Chapter 1
The Political Economy of Drought Relief
in Souther India
1.1 Introduction
In developing countries, and particularly so in rural areas, there is an inextricable
link between livelihoods and the environment. Natural disasters, such as drought,
therefore threaten the livelihoods of these households.1 Climate change threatens
to alter the timing, duration, intensity, frequency, and spatial distribution of such
events (IPCC, 2012). Governments then are likely to play an increasingly critical
role, providing assistance to households affected by such negative shocks. However,
as with many functions of government, the degree to which a government success-
fully provides this aid depends on its responsiveness to citizens’ needs. Sen (2000)
points to the importance of democracy in linking the incentives of agents (e.g., the
disaster-affected) and political incentives through electoral accountability. But even
within democracies, these links may themselves drive the political manipulation of
public programs. An important question then is whether the discretionary power of
government, which enables this politicization, furthers or obstructs the success of a
program.
This paper studies the geographic targeting of drought relief in three Indian states.
I document the degree to which relief is provided on the basis of official measures
1Previous work connects natural disasters to significant economic and health consequences across
every region of the world (Ranson et al., 2016; Stanke et al., 2013).
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of need and the extent to which allocations are distorted due to political motives. I
then address the efficacy of drought relief, establishing a positive link between relief
and agricultural production. Importantly, I provide evidence suggesting that reallo-
cating relief based on official measures of need would increase aggregate agricultural
production.
Effective drought relief is of particular importance in India, a highly drought-prone
region that is heavily reliant on rainfed agriculture. In recognizing this, India has
developed a comprehensive drought management program that incorporates relief as
well as drought mitigation and adaptation strategies (UNDP, 2002). Relief measures
encompassed by this program include food and water provision, direct cash transfers,
and increased public employment. A key feature in the evolution of India’s program
is the movement towards a rules-based allocation. India’s program then stands apart
from those in the US, for example, which explicitly incorporate discretion (Downton
& Pielke, 2001). A report on a predecessor to India’s current program cites the lack
of a clear, objective definition of drought as leaving room for political manipulation
(Rathore, 2005). The Indian government responded by issuing national guidelines
that base the allocation of relief on environmental criteria but still allowed for discre-
tion (DAC, 2009).
In this chapter, I study the allocation of official drought declarations, or an indicator
that an area received drought relief, in the states of Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and
Telangana. I construct a panel dataset of declarations for 1,284 blocks (groups of vil-
lages) for the years 2008 through 2019 and combine it with geospatial environmental
data and electoral data. In spite of the national government’s increasingly stringent
guidelines, states systematically deviate from the guidelines when allocating decla-
rations. I find that 1 in 3 drought-affected blocks did not receive relief while 1 in
4 declarations went to blocks with above-average rainfall, far above rainfall cutoffs
2
defining drought.
I develop a probabilistic voting model as a framework for assessing the potential
politicization of drought relief. The model assumes that voters reward the state
ruling party for relief with a temporary increase in electoral support.2 Drought-
affected voters, whose marginal utility of relief is higher, reward the party by more.
The model also allows for a ruling-party incumbency effect, or a shift in voters’
support for the ruling party in areas controlled by ruling-party politicians (politically
aligned areas). The ruling party then allocates relief across areas in an effort to
maximize its reelection likelihood, subject to a marginal cost of providing relief. The
model generates three testable implications: (1) drought increases the likelihood of
receiving relief; (2) a closer vote margin, or increased competition, for the ruling
party increases the likelihood of receiving relief; and (3) if a ruling-party incumbency
advantage exists then politically aligned blocks are less likely to receive a declaration
than non-aligned blocks while if aligned blocks are more likely to receive a declaration,
an incumbency disadvantage must exist.
I extend the traditional probabilistic voting model to a dynamic setting, revealing
omitted variable bias in naive regressions of the likelihood of receiving relief on elec-
toral outcomes. The past behavior of politicians (i.e., past declarations) influences
current relief allocations through its impact on electoral incentives. To overcome
this model-implied bias, I utilize variation in electoral outcomes that is uncorrelated
with local changes in political support driven by past declarations. Motivated by the
model, I instrument for a party’s vote share in a given constituency using the inter-
action of the party’s vote share in an election prior to the sample period with a state
level change in political support. The instrument for the ruling party’s vote margin is
2Existing research and media reports link drought declarations, and political manipulation, with
the state government (Poovanna, 2016; Rathore, 2005; Reddy, 2016; Bera & Sen, 2016). Cole et al.
(2012) tests the salience of this link and finds that voters reward the state ruling party for disaster
relief.
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then the difference between the ruling party’s and its opposition’s instrumented vote
shares while the instrument for alignment is an indicator that this difference exceeds
0.3
As predicted by the model, drought occurrence increases the likelihood of receiving
a declaration by 22 percentage points, relative to a mean likelihood of 33 percent;
therefore, in practice, the drought-affected are more likely to receive drought relief.
Consistent with the model, I find that drought relief is targeted to blocks that are
electorally competitive for the ruling party. A one standard deviation closer vote
margin for the ruling party increases declaration likelihood by 9 percentage points.
In this setting, ruling-party incumbency is correlated with increased reelection likeli-
hood and so the model predicts that aligned blocks should be less likely to receive a
declaration than non-aligned blocks. In line with this prediction, I find that alignment
with the ruling party reduces the likelihood of receiving relief by about 16 percentage
points on average; however, when estimating the effect of alignment controlling for
electoral competition for the ruling party, the coefficient remains negative but is no
longer statistically significant.
Related Literature. This chapter relates to a vast and important literature that
considers the political manipulation of public resource allocations. Within the dis-
tributive politics literature, this paper closely relates to existing work studying the
allocation of public programs to competitive or politically aligned constituencies and
even more narrowly to those considering such manipulation for electoral gain (Asher
& Novosad, 2017; Azulai, 2017; Bardhan et al., 2020; Cole, 2009; Finan & Maz-
zocco, 2020; Gupta & Mukhopadhyay, 2016; Sarkar, 2019; Shaukat, 2019; Shenoy &
Zimmermann, 2020).4 Recent work on distributive politics in West Bengal models
3This instrument largely follows that used by Shaukat (2019), though its exact construction dif-
fers, and also relates to George (2020) where, again, the author instruments for political competition.
4Golden and Min (2013) reviews and classifies existing work on distributive politics.
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(and empirically confirms) the allocation of public programs as dependent on political
alignment across tiers of government (Bardhan et al., 2020; Shenoy & Zimmermann,
2020). In this paper, I focus on the importance of electoral incentives for state ruling
parties in distorting state-allocated relief. The model I propose then closely aligns
with early models of redistributive politics that consider a single level of government
(Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Lindbeck & Weibull, 1987). However, I assume voters
reward the state ruling party (as opposed to local politicians) for drought relief to
predict targeting ‘swing’ (not core-support) areas, a relevant distinction in a federal
system. The model also draws on prior work that finds empirical evidence of in-
cumbency advantages/disavantages for local politicians in India (Anagol & Fujiwara,
2014; Fisman et al., 2019; Linden, 2004). I allow for a ruling-party incumbency effect,
which explains the potential importance of political alignment even when targeting
is driven by electoral competition. As predicted by the model, I demonstrate that
the state ruling party targets relief to areas in which it faces a closer vote margin
and not to aligned areas. The most significant departure from traditional models,
however, is shifting from a static to a dynamic model; this allows for a decomposi-
tion of a party’s vote share into an endogenous component, highlighting an empirical
identification concern, and an exogenous component that motivates the instrumental
variables approach.
Mirroring the results for official drought declarations in India, prior research finds
that presidential disaster declarations are targeted to electorally important/compet-
itive US states (Garrett & Sobel, 2003). Likewise, public food distribution, used for
crop damage relief, positively correlated with competition in Indian state parliaments
in an earlier period (Besley & Burgess, 2002).5 A contribution of this paper is the
identification of a robust, causal link between electoral incentives and disaster dec-
5Downton and Pielke (2001) find that US flood relief simultaneously correlates with environmental
measures defining appropriate targeting and political measures. A. J. Oliver and Reeves (2015)
further discusses existing research on the politicization of disaster relief.
5
larations. Other recent work causally identifying the impact of political motives on
disaster relief identifies disasters based on official government designations (Azulai,
2017) or geographic proximity to flooded rivers (Shenoy & Zimmermann, 2020). I
identify the impact of electoral incentives on drought relief allocations when using
a range of environmental and agricultural data to identify and control for disaster
severity.
Existing research on formula-based transfers from national to local governments ar-
gues that transfers might perfectly comply with the formula because the national gov-
ernment instead manipulates the formula itself (Banful, 2011; Ward & John, 1999). I
consider a program that is meant to be formula-driven but that largely precludes this
type of manipulation because the national government sets the guidelines while state
governments make relief decisions. In spite of this separation of power, I causally
identify political manipulation by states even when using the national guidelines as
a guidepost against which declarations can be compared.
While many papers consider the political manipulation of public resources, few ad-
dress the potential costs of this manipulation. Azulai (2017) finds a small bias due to
political distortions for ministerial grant allocations in Brazil, resulting in a relatively
small amount of misallocation. Mahadevan (2021) instead finds political manipulation
of electricity billing in West Bengal generates large net welfare losses as politicized
consumer subsidies do not outweigh costs to electric utilities. Finan and Mazzocco
(2020) estimates a large misallocation of legislative funds in a Brazilian state due to
distortions away from a region with low electoral returns but high expected welfare
gains; instead of considering a rules-based approach, the authors explore electoral
reform as a method for reducing political distortions. In this paper, I show that some
drought-affected areas, where expected welfare gains are likely high, do not receive
relief while some non-drought-affected areas do. However, in Chapter 2 I also consider
6
whether drought relief has an impact on an observed local economic outcome. I pro-
vide further evidence suggestive of misallocation by identifying a positive association
between relief and agricultural production if relief is well-targeted.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the context
and assesses the extent to which declarations follow guidelines. Section 1.3 models
the state’s declaration decision and Section 1.4 details the empirical strategy and
identification approach used to test the model’s implications. Section 1.5 provides
empirical results identifying the causal impact of the ruling party’s electoral incentives
on the allocation of drought relief. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Context
India is one of the most drought prone regions in the world and yet more than half
of India’s net cultivated area is directly reliant on rainfall (DAC&FW, 2017; UNDP,
2002). Existing literature shows that natural disasters, and drought specifically, can
lead households to resort to distress sales (Cain, 1981; Kinsey et al., 1998), migration
(Boustan et al., 2019; Gray & Mueller, 2012), or even reductions in consumption and
diet quality (Carpena, 2019; Kazianga & Udry, 2006). In India, the negative impacts
of drought, perhaps in combination with household responses, then manifest in cases
of stunted, wasted, and underweight children as well as chronic energy deficiency in
adults; further, India reported one of the highest levels of drought-related mortality
between 1900 and 2012 (Stanke et al., 2013). India’s drought management program
is a response to this combined high level of exposure and high degree of vulnerability
to drought. The program has evolved to not only provide post-disaster relief but also
incorporate mitigation and adaptation strategies aimed at reducing vulnerability to
future drought (UNDP, 2002).
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This paper studies India’s drought management program in 1,284 blocks6 located in
Karnataka (2008-2019) and Andhra Pradesh/Telangana (2009-2019). I construct an
indicator for whether a block received a declaration (non-zero relief) for the primary
growing season (June to September) using government-provided data (see Appendix
B).7 During this period, the Indian government provided drought relief guidelines in
the 2009 Manual for Drought Management, 2016 updated manual, and subsequent
revisions to the 2016 manual (DAC, 2009; DAC&FW, 2016; DAC&FW, 2018), which
states cite in declaration decisions (GoAP, 2013; Reddy, 2016).
1.2.1 Environmental Criteria and Data
The drought manuals list rainfall deficiency as the primary basis for declaration de-
cisions. According to the 2009 Drought Manual, a declaration should be considered
if: (1) the ratio of early-season (ES) rainfall to its long-term-average is less than 50
percent or (2) the ratio of full-season (FS) rainfall to its long-term-average is less
than 75 percent.8 Combining these two criteria and using the India Meteorological
Department rainfall data (Pai et al., 2014), the indicator for a block being drought
affected is
droughtbt = 1{ratioESbt < .5 ∨ ratioFSbt < .75}.9
Because of the primacy of rainfall measures in the national guidelines, combined with
the fact that rainfall is exogenously determined, I use this measures to define drought-
affected areas. Figure 1·1 depicts annual variation both in drought and declarations
6The administrative unit, located between districts and villages, at which declarations are made.
7In recent years, states have declared drought for the secondary growing season between October
and January.
8Throughout the paper, early season refers to June and July while full season refers to June
through September.
9Appendix B provides further details on the construction of this indicator, additional rainfall
measures, and variables for the other environmental categories. Also in this appendix is a description
of alternative criteria for defining drought-affected blocks using updates to the drought manuals and
state-level guidelines.
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by state. The manuals also list additional environmental factors to be used in dec-
laration decisions: cropped area, vegetation indices (remote sensing), soil moisture
indices, and hydrological indices. Where satisfying rainfall-based criteria is a neces-
sary condition for drought declarations, meeting cutoffs in these remaining categories
provides sufficient evidence of drought. Section 1.5.1 demonstrates robustness of the
paper’s main results when controlling for these additional environmental factors.
1.2.2 Administrative Process and Political Data
According to the national guidelines, the decision to officially declare a block as
drought-affected should proceed in two steps. First, the district collector (intermedi-
ate level of government) forms a committee to identify drought-affected blocks in the
district. Second, the state government forms a committee chooses blocks from each
district list to receive declarations. If followed, this procedure assigns the ultimate
decision-making power to the state.
Elections for members to the state legislative assembly (MLAs) occur (about) ev-
ery five years and are based on a first-past-the-post election system.10 The party
or coalition that wins a majority of seats forms the government (referred to here as
the ruling party). As shown in Figure 1·1, the sample period includes three elections
for each state beginning in 2008 for Karnataka and 2009 for Andhra Pradesh/Telan-
gana.11 The figure highlights the variation in the ruling parties in power both within
and across states; this provides a context for studying the importance of the ruling
party’s political motives, as opposed to political party-specific behavior. For this
analysis, I utilize data from the Election Commission of India (2019) and Bhavnani
(2014) on electoral outcomes to construct two variables that measure support for the
10Andhra Pradesh and Telangana have a bicameral system, but the legislative council is not
directly elected.
11Andhra Pradesh and Telangana become separate states in 2014, the second election in this
period.
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ruling party. First, I use the vote share for each party p ∈ P that runs in a con-





In the case of a ruling coalition, for each constituency I compare the vote share
for the party in the coalition that had the highest vote share to the vote share of
the opposition party (the party with the highest vote share among those not in the
coalition).12 If the ruling party did not run in a constituency, it’s vote share is set
to 0. I then take the absolute value of the margin, which is a measure of electoral
competition for the ruling party (as |margin| approaches 0, competition increases).
Second, I construct an indicator for alignment to the ruling party as
alignedce = 1{margince > 0}.
This alignment indicator designates whether the ruling party won in a constituency
and, therefore, will be an incumbent in the following election. This measure of ruling-
party incumbency may also provide relevant information for reelection likelihood; for
example, voters’ might increase their support for the ruling party in areas where the
ruling party won and the local politician belongs to the ruling party (i.e., ruling-party
incumbency advantage). Appendix B provides the mapping of these constituency-
level variables to block-level variables as well as information on additional political
variables used in robustness checks. Table 1.1 provides summary statistics at the
block-year level for the above measures.
12For Karnataka, I assign the BJP as the ruling party in the 2008 election (6 independent candi-
dates were in the coalition) and the INC and JD(S) in the 2018 election (1 BSP candidate helped
form the ruling coalition).
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1.2.3 Do drought declarations adhere to national guidelines?
Are drought declarations simply explained by drought occurrence? On average, about
33 percent of block-year observations receive an official drought declaration while 18
percent are drought-affected (Table 1.1). In other words, more blocks receive drought
relief than are drought-affected, suggesting that drought occurrence is not a neces-
sary condition for observed drought declarations. Figure 1·1 provides a more detailed
comparison, plotting the share of blocks, for each state and year, which received a
declaration in combination with the share of blocks affected by drought; as shown, a
significant number of declarations go to non-drought-affected blocks. Part of this mis-
targeting could be explained by small differences between state governments’ rainfall
data and that of the national government, used here, that would be especially pro-
nounced in an indicator measure.13 For this reason, I also consider how the likelihood
of a declaration varies in continuous measures of rainfall. Figure 1·2 plots the ra-
tio of current full-season rainfall to its long-term average (x-axis) against the ratio of
early-season rainfall to its long-term average (y-axis). Again, based on the guidelines,
we should expect a discontinuity in declarations at the black vertical line (marking
a full-season ratio of .75) and at the black horizontal line (marking an early-season
ratio of .5), as shown in Panel A. However, Panels B and C of the figure which plot
only declared and only non-declared blocks, respectively, show a lack of such disconti-
nuities. Instead, declarations are provided to block-year observations far from either
cutoff while some observations that met both cutoffs did not receive a declaration.
These results indicate that while variation in rainfall partly explains the allocation of
drought declarations, states do not strictly follow the criteria outlined in the national
guidelines.
13As an example, the correlation between Karnataka’s block-level data for full-season rainfall in
2018 and the block-level rainfall constructed using national data is .94.
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1.3 Model
Do state governments manipulate drought relief to improve welfare or further polit-
ical motives? To understand whether the latter might drive allocations, I provide a
probabilistic voting model that generates testable predictions relating drought dec-
larations to electoral incentives. The model proposed here builds on the traditional
probabilistic voting models used to explain distributive politics (Dixit & Londregan,
1996; Lindbeck & Weibull, 1987). One key difference, however, is the inclusion of an
incumbency effect to explain differential targeting of declarations based on alignment
to the ruling party. I also extend the traditional model to a dynamic framework,
which identifies endogeneity concerns in empirical tests of the model’s predictions
and motivates the instrumental variables approach described in Section 1.4.
I consider a two-party model in which the parties compete in each constituency and
the party with the most winning candidates forms the state government. Elections are
separated by a governing period during which the ruling party allocates declarations
to constituencies. The model begins with an election in period t = 0, so then for
t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ...} even-numbered periods represent elections and odd-numbered
periods represent governing periods.
Voter’s Preferences
An individual of type i ∈ I has an intrinsic preference for party p relative to the





14 Individual i votes for party p if their utility is higher when party p wins
than when the opposition wins the election, or ϕi > 0. Assuming the world begins




















> 0, or the population-weighted average intrinsic support
favors the party. The party that wins a majority of constituencies becomes the ruling
party and governs the state before running again in the next election.
During the governing period t = 1, voters might experience drought, dt ∈ {0, 1}, and
may receive a declaration, rt ∈ {0, 1}. In the following election in t + 1, individual i
will vote for the ruling party if
σt+1i ≡ ϕi + δi[θ(dt)rt + ζ(vt−1) + εt+1] > 0.
Declarations are positive income shocks which I assume voters associate with the
state government. Voters then respond to receiving a declaration by rewarding the
ruling party with increased support, θ(dt) ∈ (0, 0.1];16 this temporary shift in support
only impacts voting in the election that immediately follows the governing period. I
assume that voter’s utility is increasing and concave in consumption and that drought
represents a negative shock to voters’ consumption. Drought then induces a higher
marginal utility for relief, which I assume results in a greater increase in support for
the ruling party, or θ(1) > θ(0).
I include the function ζ(vt) = ζ×1{vt > 1
2
} to account for a ruling-party incumbency
advantage (ζ > 0) or disadvantage (ζ < 0).17 Consistent with existing empirical
15For example, constituencies may vary in their share of rural versus non-rural voters.
16Cole et al. (2012) considers the effect on the state ruling party’s vote share of an increase
in state-level disaster funds corresponding to a standard deviation shock in rainfall from normal.
While considering a different question, this is the closest empirical evidence for assessing the likely
magnitude of θ(dt). That paper finds an effect on the vote share of less than 1 percentage point and
so I impose an upper bound on θ(dt) that suggests moderate shifts in support due to a declaration.
17An advantage, for example, might result from voters’ increased affinity for the ruling party in
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evidence on candidate-level incumbency effects in India, I restrict the magnitude of an
incumbency effect to |ζ| < .15 (Anagol & Fujiwara, 2014; Fisman et al., 2019; Linden,
2004).18 As is the nature of an incumbency effect, this shift only impacts the election
that immediately follows. On the other hand, I also allow for a permanent, normally-
distributed, common shock to voters’ support for the ruling party, εt ∼ Φ(0, ν2),
realized at the time of the election.19 There is no permanent shock then during
governing periods, or εt = 0 for t ∈ {1, 3, 5, ...}. This permanent shock to voters’
support for the ruling party can be thought of as, for example, voters learning about
the party’s platform through its governance.
Ruling Party’s Allocation Decision
In governing period t the ruling party’s vote share in the following election is
vt+1 = vt−1 − L(dt−2, rt−2, vt−3) + θ(dt)rt + ζ(vt−1) + εt+1.20
The ruling party observes three signals for how it will perform in the upcoming
election. First, the ruling party perfectly observes the vote margin from the prior
election. Solving recursively, the ruling party’s prior vote share is equivalent to its
initial vote share (intrinsic preferences) adjusted for permanent shifts in support and
for temporary shifts in support for the t−3 ruling party due to past declarations and
constituencies where it is in power or may indicate the ruling party’s ability to manipulate elections
where it is the incumbent.
18A constituency-election level regression of the indicator for whether the ruling party is reelected
on the indicator for whether the incumbent politician is a member of the ruling party suggests ruling-
party incumbency is associated with an 11 percentage point advantage in reelection likelihood in
this setting.
19The assumptions on the distribution of the shock Φ(·) important for the model implications
are that it is mean-zero, single-peaked, and symmetric; also, the variance cannot be too large (e.g.,
ν < .3). The shock is relative to the ruling party, so a positive shock for the ruling party is a negative
shock for the opposition.
20Appendix A contains a detailed description of how voter’s preferences are generalized to a
governing period t and derives this equation for the ruling party’s vote share in that period.
14
incumbency:
vt−1 = v0 +
t−1∑
s=0
εs + L(dt−2, rt−2, vt−3), (1.1)
where






1{p = pt−3} − 1{p 6= pt−3}
]
.
Subtracting L(dt−2, rt−2, vt−3) from the prior vote margin removes the effect of the
the temporary shifts, which only last one period and so do not influence vt+1; for
example, this accounts for a declaration temporarily increasing support for the prior
ruling party and so adjusts the vote share downward (upward) if the ruling party in t
is the same (different). Second, the party knows whether it is an incumbent in period
t and is aware of an incumbency advantage (or disadvantage). Third, the ruling party
and voters alike observe drought and declarations, so that the ruling party anticipates
voters’ response to declarations.
Turning to the motives of the ruling party, I assume that the sole goal of the party
is to maximize its reelection likelihood. Therefore, in governing period t the ruling










rtc ≤ N t. (1.2)
I assume that the cost of a declaration is constant across constituencies and, therefore,
the government’s budget constraint can be thought of as a limit on the number
of declarations made in each year, N t.21 Allowing ηt to represent the Lagrange
multiplier, a drought will be declared if the marginal return to expected electoral
21This is a simplification of the actual process as the amount of money provided as relief varies
across blocks.
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where, again, Φ(.) is the cumulative density function of the shock ε.22 The party
provides a declaration if the resulting positive shift to voter support increases the
likelihood of winning by more than the marginal cost of providing the declaration,
ηt. In each year, the government will rank constituencies by their marginal return
to a declaration and provide a declaration to the N t constituencies with the highest
returns; therefore, ηt coincides with the marginal return to providing a declaration in
the N t-th constituency. The likelihood of receiving a declaration then is increasing
in the marginal return to reelection likelihood for providing a declaration.
Model Implications
In Appendix A, I provide proofs for the comparative statics I describe here.
Drought. Drought occurrence enters the model through its impact on the positive
shift in support the ruling party receives from providing a declaration, θ(dt). The
marginal return to providing a declaration, as described by the left-hand side of
Equation 1.3, is increasing in θ(dt).
Proposition 1: The likelihood of receiving a declaration is higher if a drought has
occurred.
Voters’ utility is increasing and concave in consumption, so the drought-affected have
a higher marginal utility for relief which translates into a greater increase in support
for the ruling party. In a given constituency, drought then increases the marginal
22This also relies on assuming that the distribution of ε is such that it guarantees σt+1i is within
the bounds necessary to ensure an interior solution for all types i ∈ I (see Appendix A for details).
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return to a declaration and therefore the likelihood of receiving a declaration.
Electoral Competition. The ruling party’s allocation decision is a function of
the existing support of the constituency, measured as the party’s prior-election vote
share vt−1. However, Indian state elections usually have more than two parties so
the vote share is not a sufficient statistic in empirical specifications for determining:
(1) whether the ruling party won the last election and (2) the margin of victory or
loss. For this reason, I restate the following results in terms of the ruling party’s
prior-election vote margin, m as
mt−1 = vt−1 − (1− vt−1) = 2(vt−1 − 1
2
).
With this in mind, I consider how the marginal return to a drought declaration, and
therefore declaration likelihood, varies in the prior-election vote margin. As shown
in Appendix A, the marginal return to a drought declaration is maximized for a
constituency with a baseline vote margin m̄(dt) = −[θ(dt) − 2L(dt−2, rt−2, vt−3) +
2ζ(vt−1)]. At this margin, the positive shift in support from a declaration makes
the ruling party equally likely to win or lose the following election.23 On the other
hand, a constituency with a larger margin, m
′
> m̄, is already more likely to reelect
the ruling party without a declaration while a constituency with a smaller margin,
m
′′
< m̄, is not expected to reelect the ruling party even with a declaration.
Appendix Figure A.0.1 illustrates how the marginal return to a drought declaration
varies in the prior-election vote margin for the case of drought and no drought in a
simplified setting that abstracts from incumbency effects and prior declaration effects
(m̄ = −θ(dt)).24 The return-maximizing vote margin m̄ is marked by vertical lines
23Relaxing the restriction that the mean of ε, µ, is zero, the return-maximizing vote margin
becomes m̄(dt) = −[µ+ θ(dt)− 2L(dt−2, rt−2, vt−3) + 2ζ(vt−1)].
24The model-generated relationship between the marginal return to a drought declaration and
the ruling party’s vote margin closely resembles the comparable empirical relationship between the
average likelihood of a drought declaration and the average ruling party vote margin (see Figure
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and the marginal cost of a drought declaration ηt is shown by a horizontal line. The
ruling party will allocate drought declarations to constituencies with vote margins for
which the marginal return to a drought declaration curve falls above this horizontal
line. Appendix Figure A.0.2 then illustrates a similar scenario but now allowing for
an incumbency effect. As shown in the figure, an incumbency advantage results in a
negative discontinuity in the return to a declaration between non-aligned and aligned
areas while an incumbency disadvantage results in a positive discontinuity; again,
this is because an incumbency advantage (disadvantage) means the ruling party is
already more (less) likely to be reelected in aligned areas and therefore the value to
providing relief is lower (higher) (see Proposition 3, below). Even with the inclusion
of an incumbency effect, on average, the marginal return to a drought declaration
and, therefore, the likelihood of receiving a drought declaration will be increasing in
electoral competition (i.e., vote margins closer to 0).25
Proposition 2: The likelihood of receiving a declaration is decreasing in the prior-
election vote margin for aligned constituencies and increasing for non-aligned con-
stituencies.
In other words, the marginal return to a declaration is increasing in electoral com-
petition for the ruling party and so declaration likelihood is higher in electorally
competitive areas. Allowing for prior shifts in support due to incumbency and dec-
larations, this relationship between the marginal return to a declaration and the ob-
served prior-election vote margin mt−1 continues to hold. However, the ruling party
will now consider the adjusted vote margin mt−1− 2L(dt−2, rt−2, vt−3) when assessing
the marginal return to a drought declaration. Appendix A provides the details of
how the relationship between the vote margin and marginal return to a declaration
1·3).
25While the figures illustrate this relationship for example parameter values, this effect holds for
parameters within the bounds assumed in the model.
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is affected by a prior shift in support due to an incumbency effect (Appendix Figure
A.0.3) or a declaration (Appendix Figure A.0.4).
The degree to which not accounting for these two prior shifts in support would bias
empirical estimates of the likelihood of receiving a declaration for a given vote margin
depends on a number of constituency-specific factors (see Appendix A). However, to
give a concrete example, I consider the scenario depicted in Appendix Figure A.0.4
that imposes the simplifying assumptions that there are no prior incumbency effects
and drought does not affect voter response to declarations (θ(1) = θ(0)). Addition-
ally, I assume that the constituencies with the most competitive observed margins
(|mt−1| < .1) received a declaration in the prior period, in line with the above predic-
tions of the model. Then, regressing the indicator for whether a constituency received
a declaration on the adjusted vote margin in this scenario results in a coefficient that
is four times larger than that estimated when not accounting for the bias. I return
to the issue of this bias in the discussion of empirical specifications, which follows.
Ruling-Party Incumbency. The model allows for a ruling-party incumbency effect,
which generates a discontinuity in the relationship between the marginal return to a
declaration and the ruling party’s vote margin at a vote margin of 0. An incumbency
advantage implies that the ruling party’s vote share will be ζ higher for a small
increase in the vote margin (from a margin of 0) relative to a symmetric decrease in
the margin (the opposite is true for a disadvantage). Therefore, the marginal return to
reelection likelihood for allocating a drought declaration in constituencies in aligned
areas is discontinuously lower than non-aligned areas (see Appendix Figure A.0.2).
This discontinuity in the marginal return will only result in a discontinuity in the
likelihood of receiving a declaration if there are cases in which the marginal cost ηt is
sufficiently high so that non-aligned areas are favored with declarations over aligned
areas even at margins close to 0. However, the discontinuity in the marginal return
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to providing a declaration does have implications for the difference in the likelihood
of receiving a declaration between non-aligned and aligned areas.
Proposition 3: If an incumbency advantage exists, the likelihood of receiving a
drought declaration is lower in aligned constituencies relative to non-aligned con-
stituencies. If the likelihood of receiving a declaration is higher in aligned areas, an
incumbency advantage exists.
Because of the asymmetry in the marginal return to a drought declaration in the
absence of a incumbency effect (i.e., the return maximizing vote margin occurs at
m̄ < 0), aligned areas may be less likely to receive a declaration on average even in
the absence of an incumbency effect. Also due to this asymmetry, an incumbency
disadvantage will only result in the likelihood of a drought declaration being higher
in aligned constituencies if the disadvantage ζ is sufficiently large.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
According to the model, whether a block receives a declaration depends on drought
(Proposition 1), electoral competition for the ruling party (Proposition 2), and the
marginal cost of a declaration (ηt in Equation 1.3); further, a ruling-party incumbency
effect alters the difference in the average declaration likelihood between non-aligned
and aligned blocks (Proposition 3). Motivated by these propositions, I estimate the
likelihood of a drought being declared in a block b located in constituency(ies) c(b)
and state s(b) in year t utilizing the linear probability model specification
Declarationbt =αb + αt + β0droughtbt + β1|margin|c(b)e(t) + β2aligneds(b)t
+ β3Cs(b)t + εbt
(1.4)
where Declaration is an indicator for receiving a declaration; drought is an indicator
for a significant deviation in the full-season or early-season rainfall from its long-
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term average; and |margin| is the absolute value of the ruling party’s vote margin
in the prior election e(t), a measure of electoral competition.26 I include block fixed
effects, αb, to account for unobserved block-specific factors; for instance, the share
of a block devoted to agriculture will determine its eligibility for declarations and
likely represents a meaningful division in voters’ interests (e.g., rural versus non-rural
voters) which will be reflected in electoral outcomes. Year fixed effects, αt, remove
variation due to changes in monsoon rainfall patterns or national-level guidelines
over time, for example.27 While I do not observe the marginal cost of a declaration,
I control for the total number of declarations made in the the state, leaving out




the model, this measure of the budget constraint should meaningfully determine the
marginal cost of a declaration and is the one state-year varying factor that determines
declaration allocations. However, I also provide a second specification with state-year
interacted fixed effects that removes variation in all state-year factors for comparison
(Cs(b)t = αs(b)t).
According to Proposition 1, drought should increase the likelihood of a drought dec-
laration, β0 > 0. The identifying assumption for the coefficient β0 is that drought
is exogenously determined relative to any omitted factors correlated with declara-
tions.29 Proposition 2 indicates that declaration likelihood should be decreasing in
the absolute value of the ruling party’s vote margin (increasing in electoral competi-
tion), β1 < 0. According to Proposition 3, if an incumbency advantage exists, aligned
areas are already more likely to reelect the ruling party and so less likely to receive
26Standard errors are clustered by constituency-election as political variables vary at this level.
In cases where blocks do not match to a single constituency, the block-election is used for clustering
(9 percent of blocks).
27I also estimate Equation 1.4 using alternative definitions of drought based on changes in state
and national guidelines during this period in Appendix Table C.0.6.
28I treat Telangana and Andhra Pradesh as separate states for the entire sample.
29The assumption might not hold using hydrological indices to define drought, for example, as
political factors could jointly determine dam releases of water and declaration allocations.
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a declaration, δ1 < 0. If δ1 > 0, aligned areas are more likely to receive a declara-
tion and so an incumbency disadvantage exists. The model in Section 1.3 identifies
a bias in the above regression: the ruling party’s current declaration decisions are
influenced by prior-election-cycle declarations through their effect on marginc(b)e(t)
and alignedc(b)e(t). The omission of past declarations in the fixed-effects specification
violates the identifying assumption of sequential exogeneity. Therefore, I develop an
instrument for the ruling party’s vote margin, which is then used to construct an
instrument for alignment, meant to be uncorrelated with prior-election-cycle declara-
tions.30
1.4.1 Instrument Construction for the Ruling Party’s Vote Margin
I start by constructing an instrument for the two components of the vote margin, the
vote share of the ruling party and that of the main opposition party, for each election
(2008/9, 2013/14, and 2018/19). According to Equation 1.1 of the model, the vote
share can be decomposed into: (1) the initial vote share updated for permanent
(random) shocks between the initial period and relevant election and (2) shifts in
political support due to prior-election-cycle declarations and incumbency effects. The
former component captures the variation in electoral competition relevant to the
ruling party’s allocation decision while the latter accounts for endogenous changes in
support. Therefore, I instrument for a party’s vote share in a given constituency using
the party’s 2004 vote share in the constituency updated with the state-level change
in support between 2004 and the relevant election.31 The 2004 vote share measures
cross-sectional variation in political support in an initial period prior to both the
‘confounding’ declarations and a re-drawing of constituency boundaries; therefore,
30Another way to resolve this issue would be to directly control for past declarations, but I only
observe past declarations for a limited portion of the panel. See Imai and Kim (2019) for more
details on identification in dynamic models using unit fixed effects.
31This instrument largely follows that proposed by Shaukat (2019).
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2004 electoral outcomes could not have been influenced by these declarations (for
details on mapping of constituencies, see Appendix B).32 The state-level leave-one-
out change in support excludes the constituency-specific shifts in political support
correlated with these declarations.
For each party p and constituency c, I estimate the 2004 vote share over all overlapping







Again, the purpose of this vote share is to generate an estimate for the support for
each party that would exist in the absence of changes in political support due to a
prior-election-cycle declaration; however, some of the ruling and opposition parties
in the post-2007 elections did not exist in 2004 while others did not run widely.33 In
such cases, I assign the average of 2004 vote shares for the observed ruling/opposition
parties, or a vote share of .36 (see Appendix B for robustness checks using the 25th
or 75th percentile).34 I measure the change in state-level support for each party p
between 2004 and the given election e as
∆e2004voteshare
p










where the first term is the election e vote share in state s(c), excluding voting results
in constituency c, and the second term is the comparable leave-one-out state-level
32Post-2007 declarations are allocated based on electoral outcomes in 2008-constituency bound-
aries but the instrument relies on cross-sectional variation in historical political support for the
2004-constituency boundaries. Iyer and Reddy (2013) finds that partisan politics did not strongly
influence changes in constituency boundaries.
33The YSR Congress Party (YSRCP) split from the India National Congress (INC) in Andhra
Pradesh (first election in 2014) and the Karnataka Janata Paksha and Badavara Shramikara Raitara
Congress Party split (only for the 2013 election) from the BJP in Karnataka (“BJP’s merger and
acquisitions gave it the edge in many seats”, 2018). In these cases, I use information for the existing
party.
34The mean vote share for the ruling and opposition parties in the elections e(t), the values for
which the instrument is constructed, is .46.
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vote share for the party in 2004, averaged over the 2004-constituency(ies) m ∈ M
which map to constituency c.35
Finally, I estimate the predicted vote share for the ruling party r and the opposition














Using these instruments in Equation 1.4, the identifying assumption is as follows:
conditional on drought occurrence and block- and state-year-specific factors, the con-
structed vote margin and alignment for all elections up to e(t) in constituency(ies)
c(b) must not correlate with omitted factors that influence declarations in block b
and period t (sequential exogeneity). This assumption is plausible as the variation
in the instruments is driven by cross-sectional and temporal variation in support for
the ruling and opposition parties that is not impacted by local time-varying factors
(i.e., prior-election-cycle declarations). However, two main threats to identification
remain. First, it is possible that the 2004 vote shares correlate with the 2004 vote mar-
gin which in turn impacts declarations allocated between 2004 and 2008/9 (i.e., the
‘confounding’ declarations for the 2008/9 election). Second, if an event is widespread
or has spillover effects, it may still influence the measured change in political support
despite the leave-one-out structure. In the next section, I address these concerns
along with potential violations of the exclusion restriction.




c,e)/(votess(c),e − votesc,e), where, again, I
estimate separate state-level shifts for Telangana and Andhra Pradesh in all elections.
36Appendix Table C.0.1 provides results of regressions of observed values on constructed values
for each stage of instrument construction.
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1.5 Empirical Results
I first test whether drought occurrence and electoral competition increase declaration
likelihood (Propositions 1 and 2). Column 1 of Table 1.2 provides IV (Panel A) and
OLS (Panel B) estimates of Equation 1.4 when controlling for the state-level leave-
one-out annual total of declarations and leaving out the indicator for alignment to
the ruling party. Consistent with Proposition 1, drought occurrence increases the
likelihood of a declaration by about 22 percentage points, a more than 50 percent
increase relative to a mean likelihood of 33 percent. In line with Proposition 2,
the coefficient on the absolute value of the ruling party’s vote margin is negative
across both specifications. The OLS coefficient, however, is significantly smaller in
magnitude so that, if anything, not accounting for the effect of prior-election-cycle
declarations biases against finding the result predicted by Proposition 2.37 Based on
the IV results, a one standard deviation (.10) decrease in the absolute value of the
ruling party’s vote margin, an increase in competition, increases declaration likelihood
by about 9 percentage points.38 As shown in Table 1.3, the instrumented vote margin
has a positive, significant effect on the observed vote margin; though the first-stage
F-statistic is 10 in this regression, the p-value for the Anderson-Rubin Wald F tests
is 0.0004 and so rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the ruling party’s
vote margin equals 0.39
Column 3 of Table 1.2 provides the comparable regression results when replacing the
vote margin with the indicator for alignment to the ruling party. Given that a ruling-
party incumbency advantage exists on average in this setting, Proposition 3 predicts
37This result is consistent with the example described in Section 1.3 which suggests that the bias
from not adjusting the vote margin for past declarations alone can result in a four times smaller
coefficient on the absolute value of the vote margin.
38An alternative specification that instead relies on a quadratic function of the ruling party’s vote
margin also finds declaration likelihood is increasing in electoral competition (see Appendix Table
C.0.2).
39The Anderson-Rubin confidence set at a 95% confidence level is [-2.03002,-.387722].
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that aligned areas will be less likely to receive a declaration. Consistent with this
proposition, I find that blocks aligned to the ruling party are less likely to receive
a declaration on average, though the coefficient is not statistically significant in the
OLS specification. Focusing on the IV specification, aligned blocks are 16 percentage
points less likely to receive a declaration than aligned blocks (first stage results are
shown in Table 1.3).
Column 5 then provides the results when estimating Equation 1.4 in its entirety. The
first stage F-statistic is reduced to 6 when including both endogenous variables in
the regression but the weak identification test again rejects the null hypothesis that
both coefficients are equal to 0 (see Table 1.3 for first stage results). Controlling
for political alignment causes a slight increase in the coefficient on the ruling party’s
vote margin but the difference is not statistically significant. On the other hand,
the coefficient on the aligned indicator remains negative but is no longer statistically
significant when controlling for the magnitude of the ruling party’s vote margin.
Table 1.2 also provides IV (Panel A) and OLS (Panel B) regression results for the three
specifications discussed when replacing the state-level budget of declarations with
state-year fixed effects (columns 2, 4, and 6). The results for electoral competition
and alignment are unaffected when now removing all variation at the state-year level
(annual relief funds, electoral budget cycles, party-identity of the ruling party, etc.),
though the the precision of the estimation for the coefficients is reduced. The lack of
a statistically significant difference when adding state-year fixed effects is consistent
with the model, which suggests that the only state-year varying factor that influences
declaration likelihood is the state-level annual budget constraint.
1.5.1 Instrument Robustness
In the following sections, I consider robustness checks of the IV result for electoral
competition for the specification with state-year fixed effects (results also hold with
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the less conservative specification controlling for state-year budgets). To do so, I
consider Equation 1.4 when only including the absolute value of the vote margin
as controlling for political alignment does not impact the effect of competition but
requires instrumenting for multiple endogenous variables.
Alternative Instrument Constructions
The instrument for the vote margin should be as-good-as random relative to the ques-
tion, does increased electoral competition for the ruling party increase the likelihood
of a declaration? As stated in Section 1.4.1, one concern is that the leave-one-out
state-level change in support for each party might still be impacted by factors local
to a block b (declarations) if those factors impact nearby areas. In Table 1.4, I ex-
pand the leave-out to the entire district (column 2) and to all blocks with centroids
within 100 kilometers of the centroid of block b (column 3). If the impact of past
declarations on political support was widespread, I’d expect the expansion of the
leave-out to affect the results; however, adjusting the leave-out in each case does not
significantly impact the results. Finally, it is possible that the 2004 vote shares used
to construct the instrument for the vote margin correlate with the 2004 ruling party’s
vote margin, which determines official drought declarations in the election cycle that
precedes the 2008/9 election. To determine whether this is an issue, I reconstruct
the instrument using baseline vote shares from the 1999 election interacted with the
state-level, leave-one-out change in support for each party between 1999 and election
e(t) (see column 4). Again, though the coefficient on the absolute value of the vote
margin is smaller and is less well-identified when using this earlier electoral data, it
is not significantly different from the baseline results. In conclusion, I interpret these
findings as strong support for the as-good-as random assignment of the instrument;
therefore, in the remaining robustness sections I focus on potential violations of the
exclusion restriction.
27
Additional Criteria in the National Guidelines
In a study of a formula-based public program in England, Ward and John (1999)
suggest that even when the rules are followed political influence may enter the for-
mula itself. In this setting, urban areas are not eligible for drought declarations and
political influence at the time the rules were written (which may be captured by the
instrument) could have impacted which blocks were designated as urban. I remove all
blocks in Hyderabad and much of Bangalore from the baseline sample, but I am un-
able to identify which of the remaining blocks are designated as urban by the states.
For this reason, column 2 of Table 1.5 instead removes blocks whose average night
lights in 2008 are above the 95th percentile and therefore might be considered urban.
Removing these blocks does not have a significant impact on the results, suggest-
ing potential correlation between the instrument and designations as urban is not a
concern. In the remaining columns, I focus on testing whether potential correlation
between the instrument and additional environmental criteria can explain the paper’s
findings. Column 3 adds indicators for the occurrence of a dry spell (4 consecutive
weeks of reduced rainfall) and prior-year drought as well as the ratio of rainfall to its
long-term average and its squared term for the full season and early season. Columns
4 through 7 then build on this specification, adding the NDVI (vegetation index) for
the nine 16-day periods that overlap June through September, the monthly mean soil
moisture for June through September, district-level gross area irrigated, district-level
groundwater for May and August, and the district-level ratio of current crop area
sown to average crop area sown over the period, respectively. Adding additional rain-
fall measures does cause a reduction in the magnitude of the coefficient on the vote
margin (statistically significant at 10%); interestingly, this suggests that variation in
electoral competition across election cycles correlates with temporal variation in the
severity of local rainfall shocks, even after removing ‘drought-proneness’ with block
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fixed effects. However, the coefficient then remains stable when including additional
environmental variables. Further, the finding that electoral competition increases
declaration likelihood holds and is statistically significant across all specifications.
Additional Political Measures
The instrument for the ruling party’s vote margin might also correlate with other
electoral outcomes that influence the likelihood of receiving drought relief, violating
the exclusion restriction. For example, the instrument for competition for the ruling
party might correlate with overall competitiveness; Shaukat (2019) finds evidence of
positive candidate selection (in terms of education) in competitive elections in India,
which might indicate those candidates are more effective in obtaining drought decla-
rations. The instrument may also correlate with voter turnout and the ruling party
might target relief to areas where voters are more politically active. To address these
concerns, Table 1.6 repeats the estimation of Equation 1.4 adding the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) of vote shares, including realized vote shares for the ruling
and opposition party, (column 2) and voter turnout (column 3). The magnitude of
the coefficient on the ruling party’s vote margin is not significantly changed in either
specification; therefore, a violation of the exclusion restriction due to the correlation
of the instrument with other electoral outcomes is unlikely.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the political economy of drought relief in three states of southern
India. I present a dynamic probabilistic voting model to identify potential patterns
of political manipulation. However, the model also points to omitted variable bias in
empirical specifications that relate the allocation of drought relief to measures of po-
litical incentives. Therefore, to test the predictions of the model I use an instrumental
variables approach. I construct instruments for a party’s vote share by interacting
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cross-sectional variation in historical vote shares with a leave-one-out change in sup-
port for the party at the state level. The predicted vote shares for the ruling party
and its opposition then form an instrument for the ruling party’s vote margin, a mea-
sure of electoral competition, and an indicator for alignment to the ruling party. I
show that drought-affected areas are in fact more likely to receive drought relief, as
intended by the program’s design. However, I also identify political distortions in the
allocation of drought relief. I find that the state ruling party targets relief to areas
where it faced higher electoral competition (won/lost by a smaller vote margin). On
the other hand, political alignment with the state ruling party appears to reduce the
likelihood that an area receives relief, though this result is not robust.
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1.7 Figures and Tables

























































No Drought but Declaration
Drought and No Declaration
Drought and Declaration
Note: This figure plots the share of blocks in each year that had a declaration and drought (black);
declaration but no drought (blue); drought but no declaration (red); and declaration data missing
(grey). The omitted share is blocks with no drought and no declaration. The indicator for drought
is defined as in Section 1.2.1. The tables also display the separate election cycles: 2008-2013, 2014-
2017, and 2018 for Karnataka and 2009-2013, 2014-2018, and 2019 for Andhra Pradesh/Telangana.
The ruling coalitions in Karnataka were Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)/Independents (IND), India
National Congress (INC), and INC/Janata Dal (Secular) (JD(S))/Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP),
respectively. In Andhra Pradesh and Telangana INC was the ruling party followed by Telugu Desam
Party (TDP) and Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS), respectively; in the most recent election, the
YSR Congress Party (YSRCP) came to power in Andhra Pradesh while TRS maintained control of
Telangana.
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Figure 1·2: Variation in Drought and Declarations by Rainfall Shocks
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Note: This figure contains scatter plots where the x-axis is the ratio of full-season rainfall to its
long-term average and the y-axis is the ratio of early-season rainfall to its long-term average. In
each figure, the green shaded area demarcates those blocks which meet the rainfall criteria outlined
in the national guidelines (and therefore are defined as drought-affected in this paper). Panel A then
contains only block-year observations where a drought declaration was received, with blocks that did
not meet the rainfall criteria highlighted in red, while Panel B contains only block-year observations
where a declaration was not received, with blocks that met the rainfall criteria highlighted in red.
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Figure 1·3: Binscatter of Drought Declaration Likelihood Against

















Note: Each point in this figure compares the average likelihood of receiving an
official drought declaration for all observations in a bin (y-axis) to the average
ruling party’s vote margin for all observations in the bin (each bin contains about
100 block-year observations). The curve then represents a regression of the average
declaration likelihood on a fourth order polynomial in the average vote margin (with
confidence intervals shaded).
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics for Block-Year Observations
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Declarationbt 14, 043 0.330 0.470 0 1
droughtbt 14, 043 0.177 0.382 0 1
marginc(b)e(t) 14, 043 0.011 0.147 −0.553 0.711
|marginc(b)e(t)| 14, 043 0.105 0.104 0.0001 0.711
alignedc(b)e(t) 14, 043 0.566 0.496 0 1
Note: This table reports summary statistics for block-year observations of
the dependent and independent variables used in the primary specifications
of this paper. Declaration is an indicator that a block b received an of-
ficial drought declaration in year t while drought is an indicator that the
block experienced sufficiently below-average early-season or full-season rain-
fall. The variable margin is the ruling party’s vote margin in the block’s con-
stituency(ies) c(b) for the election e(t) which precedes year t while aligned is
an indicator that the margin was positive, or that the ruling party won the
election.
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Table 1.2: Drought Declarations and Political Motivations
Declarationbt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: IV Specification
droughtbt 0.221*** 0.184*** 0.228*** 0.192*** 0.219*** 0.181***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
|margin|c(b)e(t) -0.873*** -0.909** -1.082*** -1.177**
(0.330) (0.382) (0.411) (0.520)
alignedc(b)e(t) -0.156** -0.147* -0.101 -0.089
(0.077) (0.086) (0.071) (0.080)
Observations 14,043 14,043 14,043 14,043 14,043 14,043
KP First Stage F-Stat 10 8 13 11 6 4
AR Wald F-Test P-Value 0.0004 0.0006 0.0170 0.0434 0.0007 0.0015
Panel B: OLS Specification
droughtbt 0.227*** 0.191*** 0.228*** 0.193*** 0.226*** 0.191***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
|margin|c(b)e(t) -0.197*** -0.190*** -0.195*** -0.190***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041)
alignedc(b)e(t) -0.014 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 14,043 14,043 14,043 14,043 14,043 14,043
Block and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Declarations Yes No Yes No Yes No
State-Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: This table reports IV (Panel A) and OLS (Panel B) estimations of Equation 1.4, where
the indicator for block b receiving a drought declaration in year t is regressed on an indicator for
drought occurrence and the absolute value of the ruling party’s vote margin (columns 1 and 2)
or the indicator for alignment to the ruling party (columns 3 and 4) or both political variables
(columns 5 and 6). All specifications include block and year fixed effects while columns 1, 3, and
5 include the leave-one-out state total number of declarations and columns 2, 4, and 6 include
state-year fixed effects. The results for the first stage regressions of the IV specifications are
reported in Table 1.3. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic for the endogenous variable and
the p-value for the Anderson-Rubin Wald F test are reported. Standard errors are clustered by



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.4: Robustness to Instrument Construction
Declarationbt
Baseline District 100 Kilometer 1999 Election
Instrument Leave-Out Leave-Out Vote Shares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
droughtbt 0.184*** 0.185*** 0.184*** 0.186***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
|margin|c(b)e(t) -0.909** -0.882** -0.897** -0.730*
(0.382) (0.370) (0.380) (0.410)
Observations 14,043 14,043 14,043 14,043
KP First Stage F-Stat 8 8 7 8
AR Wald F-Test P-Value 0.0006 0.0008 0.0007 0.0167
Block FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table reports IV estimations of Equation 1.4, where the indicator for block
b receiving a drought declaration in year t is regressed on the absolute value of the
ruling party’s vote margin and an indicator for drought occurrence. All specifications
include block and state-year fixed effects. Column 1 repeats the estimation with the
baseline instrument; column 2 increases the leave-out in the shift factor to exclude the
votes for the whole district in which block b is located; column 3 instead increases the
leave-out in the shift factor to exclude the votes for all constituencies whose centroid
falls within 100 kilometers of the centroid of constituency c(b); and column 4 replaces
the 2004 baseline vote shares with 1999 vote shares. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
F statistic for the endogenous variable and the p-value for the Anderson-Rubin Wald
F test are reported. Standard errors are clustered by constituency-election. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.6: Robustness to Additional Political Variables
Declarationbt
(1) (2) (3)
droughtbt 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.184***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)






Observations 14,043 14,043 14,040
KP First Stage F-Stat 8 6 8
AR Wald F-Test P-Value 0.0006 0.0012 0.0007
Block FE Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table reports IV estimations of Equation 1.4,
where the indicator for block b receiving a drought decla-
ration in year t is regressed on the absolute value of the
ruling party’s vote margin and an indicator for drought oc-
currence. Column 1 reports the specification with baseline
controls: block and state-year fixed effects. Column 2 adds
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of (endogenous) vote
shares while column 3 adds voter turnout. The Kleibergen-
Paap Wald rk F statistic for the endogenous variable and the
p-value for the Anderson-Rubin Wald F test are reported.
Standard errors are clustered by constituency-election. ∗,




The Impact of Drought Declarations on
Local Agriculture in Southern India
2.1 Introduction
In the prior chapter, I show that official drought declarations do not strictly adhere
to national guidelines meant to ensure the appropriate targeting of relief. Moreover,
I causally identify political manipulation as one mechanism driving this mistargeting.
Still, states might use their discretion altruistically to provide drought relief based on
privately observed measures of need, not captured by the guidelines, that happen to
align with political incentives. In this case, a shift from the ‘guidelines with discretion’
approach to a rules-based allocation might reduce the efficacy of the program. A small
subset of existing work in the distributive politics literature speaks to this concern by
going a step further to estimate the potential welfare costs of political distortions. A
novel contribution of this paper is how it approaches the rules versus discretion debate
by considering a related question: does the mistargeting of drought relief relative to
guidelines represent a misallocation of public resources?1
While a difficult question to answer, I make progress by evaluating the impact of
declarations on local agriculture – an important source of rural livelihoods that is
directly targeted by relief measures.2 I find that a prior-year declaration is correlated
1This question is particularly policy-relevant given the Indian government’s recent decision to
move to a rules-based allocation, strictly enforcing the national guidelines.
2Following Asher and Novosad (2020), I use a proxy for block-level agricultural production con-
structed from the difference between early-season and maximum normalized difference vegetation
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with 6 percent higher agricultural production in non-drought-affected blocks but 11
percent higher production in drought-affected blocks. First, the finding of a positive
correlation between a declaration and agricultural production in the following year is
not trivial. Recent work shows that one of India’s other public programs targeting
rural development, access to rural roads, has no effect on this measure of agricultural
output (Asher & Novosad, 2020). Second, the increased correlation for well-targeted
declarations suggests the existence of misallocation that could be resolved through
strict enforcement of the national guidelines. These results hold across a series of
robustness checks and specifications testing alternative explanations for the findings.
I also consider the differential effect of declarations across the distribution of prior-
year local rainfall shocks (as opposed to only comparing drought-stricken blocks and
all other blocks). I find a distinct u-shape in the effect of prior-year declarations on
agricultural production across this distribution: the positive correlation is highest
in drought-affected blocks (left-tail rainfall shock), not statistically different from 0
in blocks with normal rainfall (center of distribution), and positive in blocks that
experienced high levels of rainfall (right-tail rainfall shock).3 Taking these results at
face value, reallocating declarations to the 35 percent of blocks experiencing severe
negative rainfall shocks that did not receive a declaration would result in 11 percent
higher agricultural production in each of these blocks. Removing declarations from
the blocks with normal or just-above-normal rainfall (25 percent of all declarations)
does not impact agricultural production in those blocks. These findings suggest that
treating the rainfall criteria outlined in the national guidelines as a necessary condition
for relief could in fact improve local agricultural outcomes.
Related Literature. A primary focus of the decentralization literature is determin-
index (NDVI) values.
3India has a separate flood relief program but these results suggest the need for relief in cases of
excessive rainfall, which may or may not coincide with flooding.
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ing whether targeting of a program to its intended beneficiaries is improved by de-
centralizing implementation.4 This issue has been studied in the case of anti-poverty
programs by comparing targeting outcomes under local discretion-based and formula-
based allocations (Alatas et al., 2012; Basurto et al., 2020; Mookherjee & Nath, 2020).
Existing work suggests, at best, moderate gains in pro-poor targeting from imposing
formula-based approaches. The tradeoff tested then is loss of local knowledge when
allocating resources under a centralized rules-based approach against manipulation
of allocations under local discretion-based schemes. I contribute to this literature
by assessing this tradeoff in a different context, where need is measured by disas-
ter occurrence at a larger geographic scale (a shock) as opposed to household-level
demographic characteristics (poverty). Publicly-available environmental measures of
drought are less likely to be reliant on the addition of local government knowledge
for accuracy in targeting. Consistent with this assumption, my findings suggest that
enforcing national guidelines not only would improve targeting but also local agricul-
tural outcomes.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the context
and data. Section 2.3 describes the impacts of drought relief on local agricultural
output while Sections 2.4 and 2.5 consider a potential mechanism for the effect and
variation in the correlation between agricultural production and prior rainfall shocks
more generally, respectively. Section 2.5.1 provides robustness checks and 2.6 con-
cludes.
2.2 Context and Data
Once an area receives an official drought declaration (described in Chapter 1), formal
drought relief measures are initiated. States provide relief in a number of forms, such
4Mookherjee (2015) provides an overview of the decentralization literature.
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as input subsidies (cash transfers), livestock camps, water/food provision, public em-
ployment, and loan deferment (DAC, 2009; DAC&FW, 2016). While loan deferments
might only benefit those with prior bank access, input subsidies and increased public
employment target all households. In the same way that drought might have serious
consequences throughout the local economy, drought relief then has the potential for
aggregate effects. To study the extent of relief’s impacts, I utilize data on agricul-
tural production as it is a primary driver of local rural economies;5 it is also the first
sector affected by drought and, unsurprisingly, directly targeted by relief (e.g., input
subsidies to farmers).
Data on agricultural output is only publicly available for districts, which contain
26 blocks on average. To study agricultural production at the block level, I follow
Asher and Novosad (2020) in constructing a proxy for agricultural production based
on the normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI) (a satellite-based measure of
plant growth density). For each year 2008 to 2019, I proxy for crop growth by taking
the season maximum of the NDVI and subtracting the early-season NDVI (average
NDVI over the first three 16-day periods in the season), where the difference is meant
to account for non-crop vegetation. Asher and Novosad (2020) demonstrates that
this measure is a relevant proxy, showing it is significantly, positively correlated with
measures of agricultural production in Indian villages.
2.3 The Impact of Drought and Drought Declarations on Lo-
cal Agriculture
In the prior chapter, I showed that declarations break with national guidelines and
that this mistargeting is partly driven by the political motives of the state ruling
5In the 2012 agricultural year, more than half of rural households in India were classified as
agricultural households and that excludes households entirely reliant on agricultural labor for em-
ployment (NSSO, 2014).
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party. However, whether this distortion of declaration allocations represents a misal-
location of public resources is an open question. Though political motives impact the
allocation of relief, it is still possible that these motives coincide with increased need
for public programs and funds. Therefore, it is unclear whether enforcing adherence to
the national guidelines would improve the program’s affect on local economies. Prior
work on the political manipulation of public resources focuses on structurally esti-
mating the welfare impacts of political distortions (Azulai, 2017; Finan & Mazzocco,
2020; Mahadevan, 2021). In this section, I take an alternative approach towards
addressing this issue by evaluating the aggregate impact of declarations on the local
economy in drought-affected and non-drought-affected blocks. I estimate the im-
pact of declarations on local agricultural production, a primary driver of these rural
economies.6
This leads to the following specification for studying the impacts of drought and
declarations,
log(∆NDV Ibt) =αb + αs(b)t + δ0Rainbt + δ1Rain
2
bt + β0droughtbt−1
+ β1Declarationbt−1 + β2droughtbt−1 ×Declarationbt−1 + εbt,
(2.1)
where the dependent variables is the log of the NDVI-based proxy for agricultural
production (difference between maximum and early-season NDVI).7 The indepen-
6Asher et al. (2020) demonstrates that night lights correlates with measures of local development,
even in very local and rural contexts; however, it also shows that night lights might proxy for
a number of different measures. Droughts and declarations might impact GDP, population size,
electrification and other measures and night lights could proxy for any or all of these (potentially
opposing) relationships; the results of a regression analysis considering impacts on night lights would
therefore be difficult to interpret.
7Asher and Novosad (2020) uses this measure as a proxy for agricultural production and shows
that it correlates with agricultural production at a higher level of geography (and other measures
associated with agricultural production). I regress the inverse-hyperbolic sine of agricultural pro-
duction (in tonnes) for crop-district-year observations on the log of the average NDVI difference for
blocks in a district, controlling for district and year FE as well as crop indicators. I find that a 10
percent increase in the average NDVI difference for blocks in a district is correlated with about a 2
percent higher district-level crop production.
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dent variables of interest are the indicators for drought and receiving a declaration,
as well as their interaction, in the prior year t − 1.8 The specification also includes
block and state-year interacted fixed effects. The block fixed effects remove poten-
tially important variation in time-invariant local characteristics that likely correlate
with declarations and explain agricultural production (e.g., aridity, soil type, cropping
patterns). State-year fixed effects likewise account for relevant unobserved variation,
including changes in state-level public programs. I add a quadratic in the ratio of
current rainfall to its long-term-average for both the full-season and early-season as
well as monthly soil moisture in year t to control for correlation in environmental
factors across years. The coefficient β1 measures the effect of a prior-year declara-
tion on output while the coefficient β2 estimates the differential effect of receiving a
declaration in drought-affected areas.
Column 1 of Table 2.1 displays the results of an estimation of Equation 2.1. First,
conditional on contemporaneous rainfall and soil moisture a prior-year drought has
no direct effect on agricultural production. The coefficient on the declaration indica-
tor on the other hand is positive and statistically significant, as is the coefficient on
the interaction between the declaration and drought indicators. A prior-year drought
declaration is associated with a 6 percent increase in agricultural production in non-
drought affected areas but an 11 percent increase in drought-affected areas. This
increase in the proxy for agricultural production associated with a prior-year decla-
ration can be considered significant in magnitude compared to the null effect for a
village gaining access to a rural road, for example (Asher & Novosad, 2020). Further,
the more positive correlation between a prior declaration and agricultural production
in drought-affected areas suggests that declarations might be more effective when
well-targeted.
8The earliest declarations are made in August, after the agricultural season, and so impacts on
production in the primary growing season can only occur in the following year.
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2.4 A Potential Mechanism for Declaration Effects
Why might a drought relief program affect agricultural production in the following
year? According to the national guidelines, declarations should incorporate relief
that would have direct impacts on future agricultural outcomes, such as agricul-
tural input subsidies, agricultural extension support, and redirecting public works
towards drought mitigation/adaptation measures (irrigation, waterbody restoration,
tree planting, etc.). Further, the increased public employment, food and water provi-
sion, and other relief measures associated with declarations might alleviate the need
for households to shift income from agricultural investments to current consumption,
for example. In line with this argument, Abay et al. (2020) finds that households
who had access to Ethipia’s Productive Safety Net Program (similar to India’s public
employment scheme) were not only less affected by the COVID-19 shock in terms of
food security but also were less likely to report reductions in agricultural inputs.
Data on annual block-level agricultural expenditures is not available, but consider the
case in which prior-year declarations do in fact allow households to invest more in
inputs such as fertilizer or own-farm labor. The effectiveness of each input is partially
determined by current rainfall and so if declarations affect agriculture through such
increases in investment we would expect the effect of declarations to vary in current
rainfall. Consistent with this proposed mechanism, column 2 of Table 2.1 shows
that the correlation between declarations and agricultural output is concave in the
contemporaneous ratio of full-season rainfall to its long-term average.9
9In this specification, conditional on controls, the results suggest declarations are most effective
when rainfall is 55 percent above normal. While we might expect output to be maximized at a
ratio near one, a simple regression of the log of the NDVI difference on the full-season rainfall ratio
and squared ratio, without additional controls, suggests that agricultural output is maximized when
rainfall is 44 percent above the long-term average.
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2.5 Assessing the Misallocation of Declarations
Next, I consider whether the relief package associated with declarations has differen-
tial effects across the prior-year rainfall distribution, as opposed to only comparing
drought-affected blocks to all other blocks. To do so, I replace the indicator for
drought in Equation 2.1 with indicators for the quintiles of the prior-year ratio of
full-season rainfall to its long-term average. Figure 2·1 displays the change in agri-
cultural production associated with a prior-year declaration for blocks within each
quintile of the prior-year rainfall shock distribution (i.e., coefficient on declaration
plus coefficient on declaration interacted with quintile dummy). The first quintile
aligns closely with the indicator for drought-affected blocks (less than 78 percent of
normal rainfall compared to 75 percent for the indicator) while the third quintile con-
sists of block-year observations with nearly normal rainfall (ratio of 1) and the fifth
quintile contains block-years with excessive seasonal rainfall (more than 28 percent
above normal).
The effect of declarations on agricultural production displays a distinct u-shape across
the prior-year normalized rainfall distribution, indicating that the increase in agri-
cultural production following a declaration is largest in the tails of the distribution.
The result that declarations are most effective in increasing agricultural production
in drought-affected blocks holds, and is statistically significant, when now comparing
drought-affected blocks to blocks in each of the other four quintiles separately. There
is also a statistically significant rise in production following a declaration in areas that
experienced a more moderate negative rainfall shock (second quintile). Interestingly,
declarations also result in a statistically significant rise in agricultural production
in the right tail of the distribution (high rainfall). Therefore, declarations appear
to improve agricultural production in areas impacted more generally by a negative
environmental shock in the prior year. This suggests that providing aid to areas
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stricken by ‘excessive’ rainfall may be an effective disaster relief strategy, though it
is not suggested by the national guidelines for drought relief.10 On the other hand,
prior-year declarations have no significant effect on agricultural production in blocks
where prior-year rainfall was normal or just above normal.
During the sample period, only 43 percent of all declarations go to block-year obser-
vations in the lowest quintile where the positive correlation with production is highest
while 35 percent of block-year observations in the lowest quintile did not receive a
declaration. On the other hand, 25 percent of all declarations go to block-year obser-
vations with rainfall in the third and fourth quintile, where there is no appreciable
positive effect of declarations on production. Based on these aggregate declaration
counts, there was significant scope for reallocating declarations from blocks where
the estimated effect on the proxy for agricultural production in the following year
is 0 percent to blocks where the proxy for production might have increased by 11
percent; in other words, aggregate state-level production might have been increased
by reallocating declarations according to guidelines. These results then suggest that
the distortion of relief allocations, due to electoral incentives for example, is costly.
2.5.1 Identification Concerns in Estimating Declaration Effects
Why is the positive relationship between receiving a declaration and agricultural
output strongest in the tails of the prior-year rainfall shock distribution? It might
be that drought relief is designed for drought-affected areas (or more generally, areas
experiencing environmental shocks), it is better implemented in these areas, affected
households respond differently to the receipt of relief, or even some combination of
these. These are all explanations that would suggest providing relief to areas with
normal rainfall, as opposed to drought-affected areas, would result in a misallocation
10I do not have data on allocations of flood relief during this period; therefore, it is possible that
areas with right-tail rainfall shocks also received flood relief and that might explain these results.
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of public funds. However, in this section I consider alternative explanations for (1)
the positive correlation between declarations and agricultural output and (2) this
observed heterogeneity in the ‘effectiveness’ of drought declarations.
India’s drought relief program is designed to utilize other public programs to dis-
tribute much of the relief funds. For instance, declarations interact with India’s
public employment scheme by raising the household limit for days worked from 100
to 150 days. Food security measures for child nutrition associated with declarations
should be ensured through the Integrated Child Development Services and Midday
Meals schemes.11 Therefore it is unlikely that some other public program exists that is
correlated with, but not encompassed by, the comprehensive drought relief program.
However, should such a program exist, that influences local agriculture, it would likely
correlate with declarations because it is allocated based on similar political motiva-
tions. To determine whether this is an issue, it is necessary to test the results when
only using variation in declaration allocations that is likely to be uncorrelated with
such programs. Unfortunately, the instrument I construct in Section 1.4.1 is meant
to capture exactly this variation in political motives. Therefore, I instead re-estimate
Equation 2.1 (when including indicators for quintiles of the prior-year rainfall shock
distribution) with block-election interacted fixed effects; the positive correlation be-
tween declarations and agricultural output is robust to this alternative specification,
which removes all variation in state electoral/political outcomes at the block-level
(see Figure 2·2).
Secondary environmental measures should determine variation in the allocation of
declarations and also may influence the effectiveness of relief in the following year;
if non-drought affected blocks are negatively selected on other environmental criteria
this might explain the heterogeneous effects of relief. To address this concern, I add
11Singh et al. (2015) finds that access to the Midday Meals program is associated with improved
health outcomes in children that had previously experienced drought.
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controls for the lagged dependent variable and the prior-year ratio of early-season
rainfall to its long-term average (and squared ratio) and monthly mean soil mois-
ture. As shown in Figure 2·2, the addition of controls for the prior-year environment
does not impact the u-shaped relationship between agricultural output and drought
declarations.
It is also possible that declarations are associated with changes in cropping patterns
towards crops with higher NDVI difference values; the stronger correlation between
well-targeted prior-year declarations and the NDVI-based proxy might reflect changed
cropping patterns instead of increased agricultural production. As shown in Fig-
ure 2·2, controlling for annual variation in district-level crop area shares eliminates
the positive correlation between declarations and the proxy for agricultrual output
for blocks with significant positive rainfall shock;12 however, the positive correlation
between declarations and agricultural output in blocks with severe and moderate
drought is robust to controlling for changes in cropping patterns.
Finally, a potentially important omitted factor in identifying the heterogeneous im-
pacts of declarations is the amount of relief associated with a declaration. Blocks that
experienced a rainfall shock may see a stronger correlation with agricultural output
if they receive more relief funds. While I only have access to data for Karnataka in
2018, this is the first set of declarations following India’s transition to a rules-based
system; therefore, these planned relief expenditures likely represent ‘an upper bound’
for appropriately allocated relief. While I find that the amount of relief correlates
with a block’s geographic area, a proxy for exposed land/households, there is no sig-
nificant correlation with drought occurrence or severity (see Appendix Table C.0.4).
These results then further suggest that providing declarations to non-drought affected
12It is also possible that changes in cropping patterns are a mechanism influencing the (hetero-
geneous) relationship between declarations and agricultural output beyond a possible ‘mechanical’
impact on NDVI values. For example, agricultural extension provided with declarations may en-
courage changes in cropping patterns that improve agricultural output.
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blocks, as opposed to blocks with moderate and severe drought, is a misallocation of
public funds (i.e., a misallocation within the drought relief program).
2.6 Conclusion
This paper considers drought relief in southern India, a region frequently exposed
to drought and where households are highly vulnerable to the negative impacts of
drought. India’s drought relief program then not only provides for post-disaster relief
measures but also seeks to encourage mitigation and adaptation strategies. Impor-
tantly, I provide evidence that receipt of a drought declaration is correlated with
increased agricultural production in the following year; this correlation is highest in
areas that experienced severe drought but is also positive, and statistically significant,
in areas that experienced moderate drought or high levels of rainfall. On the other
hand, there is no statistically significant effect for areas that experienced about nor-
mal or just-above-normal rainfall in the prior year. I consider a number of robustness
checks to strengthen the argument that the above associations in fact represent the
impact of receiving drought relief on local agricultural production. Though sugges-
tive, these results have important policy implications for India’s disaster management
programs. The recent changes in the national guidelines requiring strict adherence to
rainfall criteria and allowing for drought relief both in the case of severe and moderate
drought will likely lead to improved efficacy of the program in terms of agricultural
production.
The Indian government provided national guidelines in the 2009 Drought Manual for
how states should allocate drought relief, based on environmental factors; however,
the national government still allowed for politicians and state government officials to
exercise discretion in drought relief decisions. This retained discretion at the state
level led to a recent Supreme Court case which found that state governments were
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failing to provide drought relief to drought-affected areas. The court case also led
to a fundamental shift in India’s drought relief program from a discretionary policy
with national guidelines to a rules-based program (Bera & Sen, 2016). It may still be
too early to tell whether the court’s ruling and updated policy will have a meaningful
effect on the allocation of drought relief. This paper, however, provides evidence
that state governments target drought relief based on political motives even while
citing adherence to national guidelines. An additional policy implication then is that
rules-based policies may not be sufficient in ensuring programs reach their intended
beneficiaries, even when those rules are externally-set; instead, a rules-based policy
combined with a credible threat of monitoring and enforcement may be needed to
achieve the intended targeting of public programs.
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2.7 Figures and Tables
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Note: This figure plots coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for an esti-
mation of Equation 2.1 where the dependent variable is the log of the agricultural
output proxy, or the difference between maximum and early-season normalized dif-
ference vegetation index, for block b in year t and the indicator for drought has
been replaced by indicators for the quintile of the prior-year rainfall shock distri-
bution. The rainfall shock is measured as the ratio of full-season rainfall in the
prior-year to its long-term average. The figure displays the coefficient estimates
for the declaration indicator interacted with quintile of the prior-year rainfall dis-
tribution and the x-axis provides the range of prior-year rainfall shock values for
each quintile. The first quintile then displays the impact of declarations in areas
affected by a negative rainfall shock (less than 78% of normal rainfall) while the
fifth quintile contains areas with excessive rainfall (more than 28% above normal).
The third quintile represents areas with rainfall around the average (about a ratio
of 1). Controls include block and state-year interacted fixed effects; the full-season
rainfall to its long-term-average (and the squared ratio); the early-season rainfall
to its long-term-average (and the squared ratio); and mean monthly soil moisture.
Standard errors are clustered at the block level.
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Figure 2·2: Robustness: Impact of Declarations on Agricultural Pro-
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Additional Controls None Block−Election Environmental Crop Shares
Note: This figure plots coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for an esti-
mation of Equation 2.1 where the dependent variable is the log of the agricultural
output proxy, or the difference between maximum and early-season normalized dif-
ference vegetation index, for block b in year t and the indicator for drought has
been replaced by indicators for the quintile of the prior-year rainfall shock distri-
bution. The rainfall shock is measured as the ratio of full-season rainfall in the
prior-year to its long-term-average. The figure displays the coefficient estimates
for the declaration indicator interacted with quintile of the prior-year rainfall dis-
tribution and the x-axis provides the range of prior-year rainfall shock values for
each quintile. The third quintile represents areas with rainfall around the long-
term average (about a ratio of 1). The first quintile then displays the impact of
declarations in areas affected by a negative rainfall shock (less than 78% of normal
rainfall) while the fifth quintile contains areas with high rainfall (more than 28%
above normal). All specifications include block and state-year interacted fixed ef-
fects as well as controls for the full-season rainfall to its long-term-average (and the
squared ratio); the early-season rainfall to its long-term-average (and the squared
ratio); and mean monthly soil moisture. The first set of coefficients (black) are for
the baseline specification. The second set of coefficients (red) are for a specification
that adds block-election interacted fixed effects. The third set of coefficients (blue)
are for a specification that adds controls for prior-year environmental measures:
NDVI difference; monthly soil moisture; and the early-season rainfall to its long-
term-average (and the squared ratio). The fourth set of coefficients (green) are for
a specification that adds district-level crop shares. Standard errors are clustered at
the block level.
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Block FE Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes
Environmental Controls Yes Yes
Note: This table reports estimations of Equation 2.1 where the
dependent variable is the log of the agricultural output proxy, or
the difference between maximum and early-season normalized
difference vegetation index (NDVI), for block b in year t. All
specifications include block and state-year fixed effects as well as
controls for the full-season and early-season rainfall to its long-
term-average (and the squared ratio) and mean monthly soil
moisture. Column 1 reports results of a specification where the
independent variables of interest are an indicator for drought
occurrence in year t − 1, an indicator for receiving an official
drought declaration in year t − 1, and their interaction term.
Column 2 additionally incorporates an interaction between the
indicator for a prior-year declaration and the current ratio (and
squared ratio) of full-season rainfall to its long-term-average
(Rainbt). Standard errors are clustered by block.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗




Segregation and the March Right:
Evidence from England and Wales
3.1 Introduction
Extreme right parties tend to be based on anti-immigrant, nativist views that privilege
one (ethnic) group above all others. Yet, oftentimes their political rhetoric targets
specific outgroups. The British National Party, for instance, is centered around the
guiding principle of protecting the future of the British native population (British
National Party (2005) as cited in Wood and Finlay (2008)); however, during the
2000s the party focused primarily on Asian Muslims as a threat to the White British
community. Why do extreme right groups target individual outgroups? What are
the underlying mechanisms that explain how politically extreme views take root in
society? We consider one potential driver, the residential segregation of the targeted
ethnic minority group. We argue that the isolation of the minority group from the
native majority reduces intergroup contact that might otherwise counter propaganda
meant to establish the minority group as a distinct outgroup or threat; areas in which
the minority group is segregated then represent a fertile environment for prejudice
views to take hold.
While the party falls definitively outside the boundaries of mainstream British pol-
itics, electoral success in 2002/2003 saw the British National Party (BNP) make
further inroads into political representation than any other extreme right party in the
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history of Great Britain (Bowyer, 2008; Copsey, 2007; Wodak, 2015). In 2018, when
the last standing BNP local councillor retired, he pointed to the London bombings in
aiding the growth of the party (Pidd, 2018). During the 2000s, the BNP capitalized
on the heightened visibility of Islamic extremism with propaganda focused specifically
on the threat posed by Muslims and Islam; this strategic targeting was made possi-
ble by the fact that laws protecting against discrimination did not extend to religious
groups during this period (Allen, 2017). In spite of the fact that 60 percent of Muslims
identified as Indian, Pakistani, or Bangladeshi in 2011, they were not protected from
discrimination in the same way as mono-ethnic religions. Wood and Finlay (2008)
argues that the BNP leadership’s rhetoric following the London bombings sought to
establish Muslims as an internally homogeneous and distinct ‘other’ in an effort to
engender negative sentiment towards the group. In this chapter, we study how the
segregation of South Asians then influences support for the BNP in England and
Wales. We focus on the party’s electoral outcomes in 2009/2010, during the height of
the party’s electoral success. We find that the increased residential segregation of the
South Asian ethnic group from the White British majority is associated with higher
electoral support for the BNP.
A key obstacle in measuring the effect of South Asian segregation on support for the
BNP is the potential for reverse causality: the anti-South Asian sentiment captured
by these political views might itself cause the South Asian ethnic group to segregate
from the native population. In this chapter, we provide a strategy for overcoming
this endogeneity concern by isolating variation in a minority group’s segregation that
is not driven by that group’s location decisions. To construct an instrument for
residential segregation, we first instrument for the ethnic minority group’s population
size using a method based on the approach outlined in Burchardi et al. (2019). We
instrument for a minority group’s population in each neighborhood as the interaction
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of (1) variation in when migrants arrived to England and Wales from that group’s
region of origin and (2) the settlement patterns, across neighborhoods of England
and Wales, of other immigrants arriving in the same historical migration period.
In essence, we utilize variation in the relative attractiveness of neighborhoods to an
‘average’ migrant in each historical migration wave and weight the migration wave
based on the number of immigrants coming from the ethnic group’s region of origin
during that period. The instrument will predict a larger South Asian population in
neighborhoods that received a high share of migration from other parts of the world
in the same migration waves in which large number of migrants arrived from South
Asia. On the other hand, the instrument will predict a low South Asian population
in neighborhoods that did not draw in high shares of other migrants or that other
migrants settled in during migration waves when few migrants arrived from South
Asia. We then take this predicted neighborhood-level South Asian population and
use it to construct separate instruments for the dissimilarity index, a measure of
residential segregation, and the South Asian population share at a higher level of
geography.
Using this identification strategy, we show that an increase in the spatial segregation
of the targeted South Asian group from the White British native population increases
electoral support for the BNP. A one standard deviation increase in the spatial segre-
gation of South Asians, measured using the dissimilarity index, increases the BNP’s
vote share by 15 and 33 percent relative to average in the 2009 European Parliament
election and 2010 UK general election, respectively. On the other hand, a one stan-
dard deviation increase in the South Asian population share reduces the BNP’s vote
share by 19 and 47 percent relative to mean BNP vote shares, respectively. Because
vote shares are measured for all voters as opposed to only White British voters, this
negative coefficient could reflect the fact that South Asians are unlikely to vote for
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the BNP as opposed to an effect of the South Asian community’s relative size on
White British voting. For both segregation and the minority group’s population size,
we find effects in IV specifications that are nearly twice as large as the correlations
estimated in OLS specifications. We interpret these differences in the framework of a
local average treatment effect: the instrument isolates variation in segregation based
on the settlement patterns of historical waves of migrants and therefore identifies the
effect on BNP voting of long-standing, entrenched segregation of South Asians.
The identification strategy relies on the assumption that the historical settlement
pattern of other migrant groups was not influenced by the antipathy of the White
British majority group measured by the BNP’s vote share. Importantly, we demon-
strate that this relationship is unique to South Asians, as the segregation of other
ethnic minority groups is not correlated with voting for the BNP. We also show that
the results are robust to controlling for polarization, a diversity index constructed
from the population shares of all ethnic groups; this alternative measure of intergroup
contact could itself proxy for unobserved, broad anti-minority sentiment.1 Therefore,
while it is possible that general anti-minority sentiment drives both support for the
BNP and the segregation of other minority groups, these results suggest otherwise.
The identifying assumption would also fail to hold if anti-immigrant, as opposed to
anti-South Asian, sentiment underlies voting for the BNP; in this case, the historical
settlement patterns of migrants might have been driven by this unobserved negative
sentiment which in turn also explains voting for the BNP. Again, the fact that seg-
regation of non-South Asian ethnic groups does not correlate with BNP voting is
evidence against this potential argument. In addition, we show that while there is
some evidence of correlation between White European segregation and voting for the
UK Independence Party (UKIP), a party with a hard stance on immigration, we find
1We do not also control for fractionalizaton because it is almost collinear with the White British
population share (correlation of -.986) and is also nearly collinear with polarization over the top 90
percent of Local Authority Districts in terms of White British population share (correlation of .983).
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no such relationship with South Asian segregation (in OLS or IV specifications).
Where alternative indices of segregation and diversity seek to measure the likelihood
of intergroup contact between randomly drawn individuals, the dissimilarity index is
constructed to account for the spatial distribution of one group relative to another.
The dissimilarity index is minimized when each group is evenly distributed across
neighborhoods and maximized when groups are wholly located in separate neigh-
borhoods. We focus on this measure as we believe that the spatial component of
residential segregation measures well the likelihood of intergroup contact, or isolation
of a minority group from the majority. However, we also recognize that this measure
of residential segregation might correlate with other characteristics of a local area that
in turn influence voting patterns. Therefore, we also demonstrate the robustness of
our findings to controlling for an area’s levels of educational attainment, rural/urban
classifications, and public housing.
A growing literature points to the settlement pattern of minorities as an important
factor shaping cultural and political views among the native population. In particu-
lar, a subset of papers show that locations with a larger immigrant population more
readily support anti-immigrant policies and platforms (Barone et al., 2016; Brunner
& Kuhn, 2018; Steinmayr, 2016; Tabellini, 2020). In the case of the historical US,
Tabellini (2020) find this relationship in spite of the fact that the feared economic
effects of immigrants do not materialize. Bursztyn et al. (2021) relies on the method-
ology of Burchardi et al. (2019) to isolate plausibly exogenous variation in the size
of an ancestral/ethnic group to show that increases in the size of the group reduces
prejudice towards the group and support for antagonistic policies; the paper also
demonstrates how the increased size of an ancestry group leads to increased expo-
sure, for example through personal contacts with the minority group. We complement
this work by studying whether characteristics of settlement patterns other than sim-
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ply the size of minority groups – namely the geographical evenness of settlement –
explain native reactions.
We are not the first to consider the impact of spatial segregation on support for ex-
treme right political views. For example, van der Waal et al. (2013) finds that among
Dutch cities, the level of segregation of minority residents is positively correlated with
the vote share of the far right “Party for Freedom.” Bowyer (2008) studies support
for the BNP in the 2002 and 2003 local elections, finding the BNP’s vote share in a
given ward correlates negatively with the ward’s Pakistani/Bangladeshi population
share but positively with the Pakistani/Bangladeshi population share of the district
in which the ward is located (the results also hold for the black population). In a way
a crude measure of segregation that accounts for the minority share in one’s neighbor-
hood and broader community, the results suggest increased support for the BNP in
non-South Asian neighborhoods located in districts with larger South Asian commu-
nities. Our context is perhaps most similar to Biggs and Knauss (2011), which uses
the size of minority groups and their segregation at different spatial scales combined
with the geographic location of BNP members to test theories of ethnic hostility. The
findings of the paper suggest that the probability of white British adults belonging to
the BNP rises in neighborhoods with a smaller percentage of non-whites and in cities
where there is a high percentage of non-whites if there is also segregation (where the
relevant minority group driving results is South Asians or Muslims but not blacks).
We differ from these papers in accounting for the likely endogenous settlement pat-
terns of minority groups.
This chapter then also relates to existing work in the economics literature that utilizes
a series of alternative identification strategies to investigate diversity and segregation
in various contexts. One set of these papers use either policy-derived or spatial-based
natural experiments to identify variation in segregation/diversity measures that is
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plausibly exogenous relative to the questions they seek to answer. Bazzi et al. (2019)
utilizes historical resettlement caused by Indonesia’s Transmigration policy to instru-
ment for measures of ethnic diversity; the authors find that increased fractionalization,
contexts where communities are divided into many small groups, leads to increased
integration while polarization, villages with few but large groups, increases attach-
ment to ethnic identity – controlling for residential segregation reduces both effects.
Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) uses the spatial distribution of different ethnic groups
(defined linguistically and religiously) along borders of countries to instrument for seg-
regation; this cross-country analysis finds that higher levels of segregation between
linguistic groups leads to poorer governance. Ananat and Washington (2009) exploits
variation in the segregation of African Americans explained by a city’s density of rail-
road tracks to show that segregation makes it less likely that pro-black legislators
will be elected, a consequence of non-black electors in segregated areas holding more
conservative views. We similarly calculate an effect of segregation that we interpret as
causal, but our chapter exploits quasi-random variation rather than a natural experi-
ment. By building on the work of Burchardi et al. (2019) to construct an instrument
for measures of residential segregation, our approach applies more generally to con-
texts in which contemporaneous ethnic segregation might be well-explained by the
historical settlement of migrants.
Finally, our question is informed by the extensive sociology literature attempting to
explain the factors that affect a majority population’s views on minority groups. The
main mechanisms which could potentially be at play are those of contact theory as
described in Allport (1954) and Pettigrew (1998); concentration theory from (Hawley
(1944) as cited in van der Waal et al. (2013)); and power-threat theory (Key, 1949;
Blumer, 1958; Blalock 1967; and Bobo and Hutchings 1996 as cited in J. E. Oliver
and Wong (2003)). We do not attempt to determine the relative importance of the
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many possible sociological mechanisms which could be at play but our results lend
some insight into which theories are most likely to have an important role in the
effects we observe. Allowing increased segregation to represent decreased intergroup
contact, or increased isolation, our results are in line with the predictions of contact
and concentration theory. An increase in segregation results in increased negative
sentiment towards the South Asian minority group, as measured through voting for
the BNP. Our results however run contrary to the predictions of power-threat theory.
While this theory suggests that prejudice for a minority group increases in its size,
we find that a larger South Asian population share is associated with reduced voting
for the BNP; however, because we consider support for the BNP by all voters, not
solely White British voters, this result may be partially driven by South Asians being
less likely to vote for the BNP.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the
historical context of far right politics in Great Britain, describes the theories linking
minority settlement patterns to anti-minority sentiments, and defines the measures
of ethnic residential segregation. Section 3.3 describes the data used. Section 3.4
outlines the empirical strategy we employ and Section 3.5 reports the corresponding
results. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Linking Segregation to Support for the Extreme Right
The sociology literature identifies a number of possible mechanisms for linking the
segregation of a minority group to the native population’s antipathy for that group.
The intergroup contact theory introduced in Allport (1954) posits that under cer-
tain conditions exposure of different groups to one another will reduce prejudice be-
tween them. Specifically, the theory predicts that cooperative interaction between two
groups of perceived ‘equal status’ towards a common goal, acting within the bound-
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aries of local laws/customs, will reduce prejudice (Pettigrew, 1998). Concentration
theory states that segregation of an outgroup highlights its within-group homogeneity
and between-group differences, accentuating the majority group’s perception of cul-
tural differences and reinforcing prejudices (Hawley (1944) as cited in van der Waal
et al. (2013)). Power-threat theory instead focuses on the relative size of the minority
group; the theory argues that as the size of the minority group increases hostility of
the majority rises due to the perceived threat to its privileged position (Key, 1949;
Blumer, 1958; Blalock 1967; and Bobo and Hutchings 1996 as cited in J. E. Oliver
and Wong (2003)).
While the specifics of the theories differ, there are clear links among them. Contact
theory focuses on how (positive) exposure between groups can reduce prejudice while
concentration theory suggests that increased isolation of a minority group, or a lack of
exposure, might increase prejudice. Therefore, both theories suggest reduced contact
increases hostility. Power-threat theory focuses on a majority group’s perceptions of a
minority group but is based on the minority’s relative size as opposed to its exposure
to the majority. Understanding the degree to which these mechanisms might explain
the White British majority group’s views of the South Asian minority group then
requires constructing measures of integroup exposure/contact and the relative size of
the South Asian minority group.
3.2.1 Measuring Ethnic Segregation
In order to construct empirical measures of the sociological mechanisms described
above, we refer to the literature on residential segregation. While this field has
proposed a number of potential measures that might capture different dimensions of
segregation, we use the traditional measures of this literature: the dissimilarity index
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and the minority group proportion Massey and Denton (1988).2 The dissimilarity






∣∣∣∣ ximxLm − xiMxLM
∣∣∣∣ (3.1)
where xim is the population of the minority group m and xiM is the population of
the majority group M in neighborhood i of district L while xLm and xLM are the
comparable measures at the district level. Because we seek to understand intergroup
contact between South Asians and White British, we only include these two groups
in constructing the dissimilarity index.3 To measure the relative size of the minority
group, we use the group’s district-level population share xLm
tL
, where tL is the district’s
total population. The dissimilarity index aggregates the difference in the proportion of
the minority population living in each neighborhood relative to the proportion of the
majority group located in that neighborhood. The index takes its minimum value of
0 when each of the ethnic groups is evenly spread across a district’s neighborhoods in
equal proportion. The index takes it’s maximum value of 1 in cases where the district
consists of perfectly monoethnic neighborhoods. The dissimilarity index, therefore,
seeks to capture the spatial evenness of the minority group’s settlement pattern. The
minority group population share then of course accounts for its the relative size in a
district.
Other segregation measures (e.g., the isolation index) combine the dimensions of even-
ness and size in an effort to measure intergroup exposure; however, these measures
then take a definitive stance on how the size of the group and its spatial distribution
should interact to influence contact (Massey & Denton, 1988). These measures then
2See Massey and Denton (1988) for a list of measures along with the dimensions of segregation
each is meant to account for.
3These two groups account for 20% to 99% of neighborhood populations in England and Wales,
with a median share of 93%. The choice to leave out other ethnic minority groups in constructing
this measure is also partly driven by the instrumentation strategy described in Section 3.4. The
instrument relies on the spatial distribution of migrants associated with these other ethnic groups
and so we exclude them from the endogenous measure.
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do not allow for separately testing the effects on prejudice of a minority group’s rel-
ative spatial distribution and its relative size. We instead consider the dissimilarity
index to be a relevant measure of exposure, where increased spatial unevenness rep-
resents reduced intergroup contact. Based on this interpretation of the dissimilarity
index, both concentration and contact theory suggest a higher level of dissimilarity
should result in greater prejudice. The South Asian population share then separately
accounts for the relative size of this minority group. Power-threat theory clearly
states that as the South Asian population share increases, prejudice towards South
Asians will increase. To the extent that a larger minority group also results in in-
creased contact with the White British community, contact theory would suggest the
opposite result as an increased population share would lead to reduced prejudice.
Importantly, to assess the separate effects of the dissimilarity index and South Asian
population share, we must determine whether these two variables measure distinct
dimensions of the South Asian group’s settlement patterns. Figure 3·1 illustrates the
relationship between the dissimilarity index and South Asian population share for
each of England and Wales’ Local Authority Districts (LADs).4 While the dissim-
ilarity index is positively correlated with the South Asian population share in this
sample, the figure demonstrates that there does not appear to be a strong, systematic
relationship between dissimilarity and the minority group’s relative size. To further
demonstrate how these two measures vary, Figure 3·1 highlights Waltham Forest and
Oldham as an example in which two districts have a similar South Asian population
share, 17 and 19 percent, but a very different dissimilarity index. Figure 3·2 provides
maps of the South Asian population relative to the South Asian-White British com-
bined population in each neighborhood for the two districts. The figure makes clear
that even though South Asians have a similar relative size in both LADs, the South
Asian minority group is far more spatially segregated from the White British major-
4See Table 3.1 for a definition of ethnic groups and their share of the total UK population.
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ity in Oldham than in Waltham Forest (dissimilarity indexes of about .73 and .35,
respectively). On the other hand, Figure 3·1 highlights Lambeth and Merton as an
example of two districts with a similar dissimilarity index (illustrated in Figure 3·3)
but very different South Asian population shares: South Asians account for about 14
percent of Merton’s population compared to 4 percent in Lambeth.
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.3.1 Population Data
To construct measures of segregation and isolation, population counts by ethnic group
are needed for two geographic levels: districts and the neighborhoods that make up a
district. In order to correspond to the electoral data, we construct our district-level
measures for two different levels of geography: Local Authority Districts (LADs) and
parliamentary constituencies. LADs are historically delineated administrative bound-
aries that define units of local government.5 Parliamentary constituency are instead
based on electoral boundaries and are the unit at which voting for British parliamen-
tary elections takes place. Districts, defined in both ways, are wholly located within
Government Office Regions (England is divided into 9 regions and Wales is a single
region).
The 2011 UK Census reports full population count tables for England and Wales by
1) detailed ethnicity and 2) country of birth by period of arrival to the country.6
The Output Area – consisting of between 40 and 200 households each – is the most
granular level at which data is reported. However, to maintain confidentiality of
the reported data, statistical disclosure control measures are implemented. These
5We exclude the City of London and the Isles of Scilly, which are denoted as districts sui generis
(in a class of their own) and are much smaller than typical districts. Consequently, these two districts
contain only a single neighborhood and are therefore dropped from the sample as we cannot construct
an appropriate measure of isolation/dissimilarity.
6We obtain population counts, maps for geographic boundaries, and crosswalks between geo-
graphic levels from the UK’s Office for National Statistics.
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measures include record switching, whereby households may be randomly relocated
to another geography if certain characteristics are especially uncommon and therefore
identifiable Longhurst et al. (2007). Since our isolation and dissimilarity measures for
South Asians are highly dependent on population counts within specific geographies,
this method of data manipulation could potentially introduce significant measurement
error. However, records were swapped primarily across different Output Areas but
generally within Middle-Layer Super Output Areas, which contain populations of
7,000 on average. Therefore, we define neighborhoods as Middle-Layer Super Output
Areas.
Ethnicity
The census divides the population into detailed ethnic groups which fall under five
larger ethnicities: white, Black/African/Caribbean/Black British (hereafter black),
Asian/Asian British, mixed/multiple groups, and other. Within these five larger
groups, there are between 26 and 71 sub-ethnic groups. English/Welsh/Scottish/North-
ern Irish/British white constitutes the largest ethnic group, accounting for just over
80 percent of the total population for England and Wales, and therefore can be con-
sidered the majority group. From the remaining 20 percent of the population we
group together more detailed ethnicity groups into the larger minority groups that
might be impacted by anti-ethnic or anti-immigrant sentiment. We first construct an
ethnic group for non-white South Asians, as individuals who identify as white may
be White British individuals from South Asia. We then use the detailed ethnicity
categories to define each remaining group, again using these detailed characteristics
to exclude individuals who are likely ethnically White British or South Asian. The
ethnic minority groups we construct are as defined in Table 3.1, which also shows the
mapping between minority groups and regions of the world. As shown, non-white
South Asians (referred to as South Asians throughout) account for nearly 6 percent
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of the population in England and Wales while the remaining five minority categories
make up about 10 percent (Irish make up about 1 percent of the population and the
remaining 3 percent was not classified into a specific ethnic group).7 We also use the





Country of Birth (Immigration)
The census also reports population counts by country or region of birth and the year
of last arrival in the UK.9 The year of arrival to the UK is reported in the following
bins: 1) before 1960 2) 1961-1970 3) 1971-1980 4) 1981-1990 5) 1991-2000 6) 2001-
2003 7) 2004-2006 8) 2007-2009 9) 2010-2011. We use population counts reported for
each level of these two questions to identify waves of immigration to the England and
Wales from each region of the world. Due to the fact that the 2011 census is the first
to ask about year of arrival, we define waves of immigration to the UK based on the
population of first generation immigrants residing in England and Wales in 2011.10
7The remaining 3 percent of individuals were not categorized into a specific ethnic minority group
because the information provided was not sufficient for distinguishing between groups. For example,
individuals who identified as ‘British Asian’ were not categorized because it was not clear whether
they were South Asian or East/Southeast Asian.
8We chose to use all detailed ethnic groups as defined by the UK census as the number and size
of groups could be important in determining polarization; however, in fact the correlation between
this measure of polarization and the one constructed after grouping the detailed ethnicity groups is
.98, suggesting it does not make a difference in this case.
9The question for year of arrival does not explicitly state that the individual should report the
year in which the individual first arrived to reside in the UK but does state that short trips outside of
the UK should not be considered. To the extent that individuals interpret this question in different
ways, there may be measurement error in using this variable as the year of immigration.
10The waves of immigration, as we define them, do not account for return migration or internal
migration that may have occurred between the period of immigration and 2011; each of these factors
may lead to bias in our estimates of the number of immigrants from a given region of the world to
a specific neighborhood within England and Wales.
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Population Density
The ONS Open Geography Portal publishes boundary shapefiles for all UK LADs,
with the attached database file including its area. The ethnicity population counts by
OA can be aggregated to the LAD level to obtain the total population, which allows
us to calculate the population density in thousands of people per squared kilometer,
to use as a control in our specifications.
Demographic Measures
To control for the socioeconomic characteristics of the LAD, we use the UK census
“approximate social grade,” which estimates a person’s socioeconomic class (based
primarily on occupation). The measures is imputed from census characteristics and
reported as one of four categories: 1) AB or upper/middle class, 2) C1 or lower middle
class, 3) C2 or skilled working class and 4) DE or working class and non-working.
For educational attainment, we calculate the proportion of the population, and of the
White British population, in each LAD with their highest qualification earned being
of B.A./B.Sc. level or above.11 We also obtain data on the Rural Urban Classification,
which provides the share of the LAD’s population that is rural and also categorizes
each LAD into: mainly rural, largely rural, urban with significant rural, urban with
minor conurbation, or urban with major conurbation. Finally, we estimate the share
of households living in public housing, which is both a measure of demographics and
public expenditures; this variable is constructed from data on ”housing tenure type”
from the UK Census and is calculated as the proportion of households that rent from
either the local council or through other social renting programs.
11This measure does not include those with apprenticeships, vocational qualifications, or foreign
qualifications but does include post-graduate professional degrees such as nursing diplomas.
70
3.3.2 Voting Data
We utilize voting data for elections held in England and Wales in 2009 and 2010.
These elections occur in the latter part of the period in which the BNP was achieving
electoral success and therefore had a measurable base of support.
European Parliament Elections
As a member of the EU, the UK is allocated a number of seats in the European
Parliament based on the relative size of its population. In England and Wales, a
proportional electoral system is used where parties submit a candidate list for each
region and are awarded seats based on the relative number of votes they receive.
Electors then cast votes for a single party, choosing among those that have submitted
a list in their region. For this election the BNP submitted a list in each constituency
which enables us to observe potential BNP support in a way that is not possible using
voting data for a general election, where electors vote for a candidate but may only
vote for BNP in the constituencies that field a candidate. Currently, we use party
vote share data reported by the UK Electoral Commission at the district level for
England, where each of the nine regions is a separate constituency. We also construct
the comparable vote shares for the 2004 European Parliament election.
UK General Election
In England and Wales, citizens in each parliamentary constituency vote for members
to the British parliament in first-past-the-post elections. We use voting data for the
UK’s 2010 General Election from the UK Electoral Commission, which is provided
at the parliamentary constituency level.
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3.4 Empirical Strategy
In this chapter, we consider the case of South Asians in England and Wales to de-
termine whether the segregation of an ethnic minority community impacts antipathy
of the native population towards that group, as measured through voting behavior;
specifically, we will consider how the size and spatial settlement pattern of the South
Asian community in a district (LAD) impacts the vote share of the BNP.
To do so, we first consider specifications of the form
VL = βDL + ζshareSA,L + C
′
Lγ + δG + eL (3.3)
where VL is a measure of vote shares for a given election in district L, DL is the
dissimilarity index for the district, shareSA,L is the share of South Asians in the dis-
trict population (xLm
tL
), CL are district-level controls, and δG represents region-level
indicator variables. Ideally, VL should measure the vote share of the white British
population; however, voting data by ethnic group is not available so VL instead mea-
sures the vote share of a district for all valid votes. The size and spatial distribution
of a district’s ethnic minority community may be correlated with the demographic
makeup of the district which itself may influence voting behavior; therefore, we in-
clude as controls the share of the population belonging to each social grade and the
share of the White British population that is college educated (see Section 3.3 for
details).
Both contact and concentration theory suggest that increased antipathy towards
South Asians will result from a rise in the spatial separation of the South Asian popu-
lation from the White British majority. Assuming that increased antipathy translates
into increased voting for the BNP, the theories predict β > 0. While concentration
theory is, to some degree, silent on the effect of the size of the minority group, both
contact theory and threat theory predict a change in anti-South Asian sentiment as
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the share of South Asians in a district changes. According to threat theory antipa-
thy should increase with size so that ζ > 0. Contact theory predicts a decline in
anti-South Asian sentiment, ζ < 0, if the prevailing effect of an increase in South
Asian population share is to increase exposure. A further complication, while threat
theory unequivocally predicts ζ > 0 when measuring the impact on voting by white
British, the voting data available is not limited to the majority (native) population.
Combined with the act that South Asian voters likely would not choose the BNP, it
is possible that we find ζ < 0 due to a mechanical effect of the relative size of the
South Asian population.
One threat to the identification for and β is if the sentiment of the native population
within the district affects the settlement patterns of the South Asian ethnic minority
group. Similarly, a violation of the identification for ζ would occur if the natives’
antipathy for South Asians in a given district, or some neighborhoods within it, af-
fected the number of South Asians choosing to live within the district. Take as an
example a district with a high level of anti-South Asian sentiment; the antipathy of a
neighborhood’s population may be readily observable through marches or demonstra-
tions by groups like the National Front, BNP, or English Defense League (depending
upon the period). In this district, South Asians may choose to self-isolate in order
to avoid increased contact with a ‘hostile’ majority community. In the future, South
Asian individuals moving into this district may be more likely to locate in areas with
an established South Asian community also due to anti-South Asian sentiments or
due to positive network effects. In this case, it is anti-other sentiment that causes
spatial segregation. In addition, South Asian individuals may choose to move out
of the district, which would impact the contemporaneous share of the South Asian
population which in turn may reduce the future population size due to a reduction in
the enclave-pull for future South Asian immigrants. A related threat to identification
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then is reverse causality, as increased voting for the BNP may itself affect the settle-
ment decisions of South Asian individuals; this might be of particular concern as the
BNP voting used to proxy for anti-Asian sentiment is for elections in 2009-2010 while
the census data used for constructing population shares and segregation is measured
in 2011.
To overcome these concerns, we begin by isolating exogenous variation in the South
Asian population’s location decision. Specifically, we employ a method similar to that
outlined in Burchardi et al. (2019), using information from past immigration waves
to the UK to estimate the current location of ethnically South Asian individuals. As
a preliminary step in using immigrant settlement patterns to determine the neigh-
borhoods in which the minority group is located, the South Asian ethnic group m is
first mapped to its ‘origin’ region of the world r, South Asia (see Section 3.3). The
population of South Asians in a given neighborhood i in 2011, xim, is then estimated
as









where αL are indicators for the district L in which neighborhood i is located, I
t
r,−L
(the push factor) is the total number of immigrants from region r into England and




is the fraction of all immigrants to England and Wales in period t, excluding all
immigrants from region r, that choose to locate in neighborhood i.12 In other words,
we interact the number of immigrants from South Asia to all other districts in England
and Wales in each immigration wave with the share of all immigrants from regions
other than South Asia that move to neighborhood i in that wave; this interaction
variable then determines how many South Asian immigrants would locate in each
12We exclude Irish immigrants from the instruments as the settlement patterns of Irish individuals
might more closely relate to white British than the average migrant. We also exclude from the pull
factor migrants from Arab and North African countries whose settlement patterns may also be
influenced by the anti-Muslim sentiment captured by voting for the BNP.
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neighborhood based on the general settlement patterns of immigrants in that wave.
By removing South Asian migrants to L from the push factor, we ensure that the
select group of South Asian immigrants that locate in the district of interest are not
explaining the factors driving migrants from South Asia to England and Wales in a
given immigration wave. Likewise, by excluding South Asian migration from the pull
factor, we estimate the size of the South Asian community in a neighborhood that can
be explained by the relative location choices of all other immigrants to England and
Wales in that period. A possible cause for concern in defining this pull factor is that
we define a migrant’s region of origin based on their country of birth and not their
ethnic origin; therefore, immigration counts for Sub-Saharan Africa, for example,
could include ethnically South Asian individuals. However, only 5% of individuals
living in England and Wales who identify as Asian or Asian British were born outside
of the UK or South Asia; because granular ethnicity data is not available by country
of birth, this share includes not only ethnically South Asian individuals but all Asian
individuals.
The sum of these push-pull interactions for a given neighborhood then aggregates the
location’s relative attractiveness to the ‘average’ migrant over time, weighting by each
period’s aggregate flow of migration from South Asia to other regions of England and
Wales. The instrument is meant to abstract from positive or negative attributes of
the neighborhood that are specific to the South Asian community, such as the anti-
South Asian sentiment of the native population or self-segregation motives/enclave
effects. Instead the instrument measures the part of location choice that is dependent
on factors affecting all immigrant communities, such as job availability or housing
prices.13
13What is left after instrumenting for the population of the minority group in a neighborhood is
the part of location choice that can be explained by non-group specific factors, such as economic
motives, so should an enclave exist in the predicted value of xi it is one which has been formed
‘naturally’ due to contemporaneous conditions as opposed to having been promulgated by the social
75










ensuring that predicted population counts are non-negative. Figure 3·4 depicts the
relationship between the predicted neighborhood-level South Asian population and
observed population.















We use the above instruments for the dissimilarity index and population share of
the South Asian community to estimate Equation 3.3 with an instrumental variable
approach. This specification involves two endogenous variables with first stages
DL = κD̂L + τ ŝhareSA,L + C
′
Lγ + δG + uL and (3.6)
shareSA,L = ηD̂L + θŝhareSA,L + C
′









∣∣∣∣CL, δg) = 0.
In words, we assume that any omitted factor correlated with voting for the BNP
in a given district does not also correlate with the variation in settlement patterns
of the South Asian ethnic group that is explained by where non-South Asian immi-
pull of past South Asian migration.
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grants were settling in England and Wales during historical migration waves. This
instrumentation strategy then rests on the assumption that the settlement patterns of
other immigrants were not influenced by the same antipathy from the White British
majority group that is reflected in voting for the BNP. We test the validity of this
assumption and address remaining potential identification concerns in Section 3.5.
3.5 Empirical Results
3.5.1 Targeting South Asians or the Other?
The motivation for focusing on the South Asian ethnic group stems from the BNP’s
targeting of Asian Muslims (and Muslims more generally). However, does this tar-
geting by the party translate into a relationship between political support and White
British-minority group contact? Does this unique emphasis in the party’s rhetoric on
the South Asian community result in a singular relationship?
Existing work suggests that support for the BNP correlates with the size of the
neighboring Pakistani/Bangladeshi communities (Bowyer, 2008), but here we assess
whether the size and spatial distribution of the ethnically South Asian community
influences support for the BNP. Column 1 of Table 3.2, which displays regression
results for Equation 3.3, demonstrates a significant positive correlation between the
dissimilarity index for South Asians and voting for the BNP in both the European
Parliament and general elections. The size of the South Asian group is negatively
correlated with support for the BNP in the general election and not significantly
correlated with BNP voting in the European Parliament election. Because the voting
data includes voting by non-White British citizens, this negative correlation could
simply reflect the fact that ethnic minority individuals are unlikely to vote for the
BNP. This mechanical effect however is limited by the fact that the South Asian
community makes up, on average, about 4 percent of the population in LADs and 5
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percent of the population in constituencies. Columns 2 through 6 of Table 3.2 assess
the correlation between residential segregation (and population share) and voting for
the BNP (Equation 3.3) for five other minority ethnic groups (described in Table
3.1). We find no correlation between BNP support and the dissimilarity index for
any of the other minority groups in either election. Therefore, while there is evidence
of variation in BNP support associated with the spatial distribution of South Asians,
this result is unique to this ethnic minority group.
3.5.2 The Effects of Segregation and Size of the South Asian Community
on BNP Support
To understand the relationship between exposure to a minority group and extreme
right political views, we consider the impact of segregation of South Asians on voting
for the BNP. Table 3.3 displays the OLS estimation of Equation 3.3 for the European
Parliament election (column 1) and the UK General election (column 3). We find a
positive correlation between the segregation of a district’s South Asian community and
voting for the BNP in both elections: a one standard deviation increase in dissimilarity
correlates with an 8 percent and 18 percent relative-to-mean increase in the BNP vote
share for the European Parliament and general election respectively. On the other
hand, we find that voting for the BNP is decreasing in the relative size of the South
Asian minority group. While the results suggest a significant relationship between
dissimilarity (and the South Asian population share) and voting for the BNP, to
the extent that voting for the BNP, or the beliefs it reflects, cause segregation, for
instance, the effects are not causal. For this reason, we consider the comparable
instrumental variable specifications, using the instruments constructed as described
in Equation 3.4 for the dissimilarity index and South Asian population share. This
IV approach isolates variation in the settlement pattern of the South Asian ethnic
group that can be explained by the location decisions of immigrants from outside of
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South Asia over time.
Table 3.3 displays the IV estimation of Equation 3.3 for the European Parliament
election (column 2) and the UK General election (column 4) while Panel B of the
table provides the first stage regressions for each endogenous regressor. We find
that a one standard deviation increase in dissimilarity causes a rise in the BNP’s
vote share of about 15 percent and 33 percent relative to mean for the European
Parliament election and general election, respectively. In contrast, a one standard
deviation increase in the share of the South Asian population reduces voting for the
BNP by 19 percent and 47 percent in the European Parliament election and general
election, respectively. Again, to the extent that decreased segregation and increased
relative minority group size increase (positive and negative) exposure, these results
are consistent with the predictions of both contact and concentration theory but not
threat theory; a decrease in the likelihood of the South Asian group’s exposure to the
White British majority leads to a rise in support for the BNP. The second result goes
against the prediction of threat theory as a larger South Asian population share does
not result in increased voting for the BNP. However, with regards to the results for
the relative South Asian population size, it is unclear whether this finding is driven
by South Asian individuals not voting for the BNP or if this is instead indicative of
a reduction in anti-South Asian sentiment resulting from increased exposure.
3.5.3 Anti-South Asian Versus Anti-Immigrant Sentiment
The results of Table 3.3 show that a rise in the dissimilarity index for South Asians
increases the BNP vote share; further, the coefficient on the dissimilarity index in
the IV specification is nearly twice as large as that of the OLS specification. In
using variation based on the historical settlement patterns of immigrants, the IV ap-
proach might result in a larger effect if areas with longstanding ethnic segregation see
increased antipathy for the minority community; however, an alternative interpreta-
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tion might be that the difference between OLS and IV results indicates that support
for the BNP more accurately reflects antipathy for migrants. The results in Table
3.2 already suggest this is unlikely, as voting for the BNP does not even correlate
with the segregation of all minority ethnic groups but instead is uniquely related to
South Asians (and perhaps Arabs/North Africans). A second approach to addressing
this concern is to consider whether we find similar results for the impact of South
Asian segregation on voting for other political parties whose platform might reflect
anti-immigrant sentiment.
The UK Independence Party (UKIP) is another British party on the right of the
political spectrum, perhaps best known for supporting Brexit but also more generally
for championing stricter immigration policies as one of its primary political issues.
While the two parties share similarities among other political views and supporters’
demographics, it has been suggested that the BNP is more openly racist; further,
the BNP defines British identity based on race and ancestry where UKIP does not
impose ethnic-based limitations on which individuals might identify as British (Ford &
Goodwin, 2014). While not conclusive evidence, if the IV results found for the BNP
are largely driven by negative views towards immigrants one might expect similar
results for UKIP. To determine whether this is the case, Table 3.4 presents the results
of an estimation of Equation 3.3 where the outcome of interest is now UKIP’s vote
share in a given election. The OLS specification, shown in column 1, suggests that
the segregation of South Asians does not correlate with voting for UKIP in either
election. The comparable IV specification likewise finds no effect of South Asian
residential segregation on support for UKIP. Given the anti-immigration platform of
UKIP, if the IV approach simply was reflecting the effect of the spatial distribution of
immigrants on antipathy for migrants, we would have expected a significant positive
coefficient on the dissimilarity index. This non-result is not likely to reflect UKIP
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support being unaffected by exposure to minority groups as, at least in the case of
the general election, the residential segregation of White Europeans is significantly,
positively correlated with UKIP’s vote share (column 2 of Table 3.4).
3.5.4 A Role for Segregation Beyond Correlations with Demographics
A primary concern for identification in this cross-sectional analysis is that the segrega-
tion and size of the South Asian population might correlate with other characteristics
of an area that influence political views and voting. To determine the degree to which
omitted variable bias might be driving our findings, we consider alternative specifica-
tions that control for additional local characteristics of LADs likely to be correlated
with political views in the European Parliament election specification (Table 3.5).
Column 1 provides the baseline specification, which controls for region indicators,
the share college educated among the White British population, and the share of
the population classified as middle middle class, lower middle class, and working
class/non-working, with upper middle class as the omitted group. Within regions,
an increase in the shares of non-upper middle class populations is associated with
increased voting for the BNP. In column 2, we include additional controls for the
the college educated share of the total population which, like the share college edu-
cated of the White British population, is negatively correlated with support for the
BNP. We also add a control for the standard deviation of the share of the population
that is college educated across neighborhoods within an LAD. This control, which is
meant to account for the possibility that a high degree of ethnic segregation across
neighborhoods might also correlate with a high degree of variation in education across
neighborhoods, is not significantly correlated with the BNP vote share. Column 3
controls for the potential correlation between how rural/urban an area is and extreme
right voting, including indicators for rural/urban classes, population density, and the
rural population share. While conditional on region and rural/urban class indicators
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more rural areas have lower BNP voting, the coefficient on the dissimilarity index
remains largely unchanged. To account for the potential role of public housing in
explaining segregation and the fact that public goods provision might correlate with
support for the BNP, we additionally control for the share of the population that
lives in public housing (column 4).14 We find that an increase in the share of the
population living in public housing is associated with increased support for the BNP
but find no impact on the results for the effect of South Asian segregation. Finally,
we add polarization, a diversity measure that might provide an alternative measure
of anti-other sentiment in a district (column 5). While we do find that increased
polarization is associated with increased voting for the BNP, it does not meaningfully
impact our results on South Asian segregation and population size. In all, our find-
ing that a rise in South Asian segregation increases support for the BNP is robust
to controlling for other local characteristics of the population/electorate that might
influence voting for the BNP.
3.6 Conclusion
Why might residential segregation result in increased support for extreme right polit-
ical views? To the extent that residential segregation accurately measures intergroup
exposure, the sociological theories on contact, concentration, and threat all posit a
relationship between intergroup contact and each group’s view of one another. Be-
cause extreme right groups tend to exploit anti-minority sentiments, these theories
then predict a linkage between support for these parties and residential segregation
of the targeted minority group. We find support for this relationship in the context
of the residential segregation of South Asians in England and Wales and electoral
14Bowyer (2008) similarly found that support for the BNP in the 2002/2003 local elections in
England correlated positively with the share of the population living in overcrowded housing and
negatively with the share of the population with high levels of education.
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support for the British National Party.
While prior work has established the effect of segregation on support for extreme right
political movements, this chapter provides a methodology for identifying plausibly
exogenous variation in ethnic residential segregation based on the past settlement
patterns of migrants. Using this identification strategy, we show that the increase in
the BNP’s vote share due to increased South Asian residential segregation reflects a
causal relationship. In fact, the IV approach finds a higher impact of segregation,
consistent with the view that more longstanding, entrenched segregation represent a
long-term lack of exposure that causes even stronger support for extreme right views.
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3.7 Figures and Tables




















Note: This figure plots South Asian-White British dissimilarity index against the
South Asian share of total population by LAD. The solid horizontal and vertical
lines each demarcate the median values over all LADs. Highlighted and labeled
points represent LADs whose disaggregated maps of South Asian settlement are
shown in Figures 3·2 and 3·3.
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Figure 3·2: Spatial Patterns in Two Districts with Different Dissimi-







Share: 0.173, D:0.348, Area: 38.81 sq. km.
South Asian Share in Waltham Forest, London
Share: 0.186, D:0.73, Area: 142.34 sq. km.
South Asian Share in Oldham, North West
Note: This choropleth shows the spatial distribution of South Asians in two LADs
with similar proportion of the total population identifying as South Asian but dif-
ferent dissimilarity between the South Asian and White British groups. Oldham
(right map) has a higher dissimilarity index than Waltham Forest (left map). Shade
represents the size of the South Asian population relative to the South Asian-White
British combined population within each neighborhood of the LAD as a way of visu-
alizing the variation in the dissimilarity index. The figure also reports each LAD’s
dissimilarity index and South Asian population share.
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Figure 3·3: Spatial Patterns in Two Districts with Similar Dissimi-







Share: 0.039, D:0.234, Area: 26.81 sq. km.
South Asian Share in Lambeth, London
Share: 0.138, D:0.291, Area: 37.62 sq. km.
South Asian Share in Merton, London
Note: This choropleth shows the spatial distribution of South Asians in two LADs
with similar dissimilarity between the South Asian and White British groups but
different overall percent of South Asians in the total population. Lambeth (left
map) has a more sizable overall South Asian population share than Merton (right
map). Shade represents the size of the South Asian population relative to the South
Asian-White British combined population within each neighborhood of the LAD as
a way of visualizing the variation in the dissimilarity index. The figure also reports
each LAD’s dissimilarity index and South Asian population share.
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Note: This figure provides a binscatter of the mean neighborhood South Asian pop-
ulation share relative to the predicted mean neighborhood South Asian population
share described in Equation 3.5. Each point represents about 20 neighborhoods. As
shown in the figure, a regression of the South Asian share on the predicted South


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.2: Segregation of Ethnic Groups and Support for the British
National Party
BNP Vote Share
South White Sub-Saharan Caribbean/Latin Arab/North East/Southeast
Asian European African American African Asian
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: European Parliament Election 2009
D 0.041*** -0.014 0.016 -0.011 0.018 -0.006
(0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016)
ShareGroup -0.081*** -0.084 0.162 0.033 -0.147 -0.020
(0.024) (0.071) (0.121) (0.089) (0.154) (0.177)
Observations 324 324 324 324 324 324
R2 0.549 0.522 0.529 0.517 0.521 0.517
Panel B: UK General Election 2010
D 0.030*** -0.005 -0.002 -0.012 0.000 -0.004
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
ShareGroup -0.065*** -0.042 0.051 -0.101** -0.099 0.048
(0.012) (0.049) (0.066) (0.046) (0.083) (0.116)
Observations 573 573 573 573 573 573
R2 0.328 0.285 0.285 0.292 0.284 0.283
Region Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table reports estimates of Equation 3.3 where the BNP vote share is regressed on the dissimilarity index
for and population share of a given ethnic minority group. Panel A reports results for the European Parliament
Election at the LAD level for England while Panel B reports results for the UK General Election at the constituency
level. All regressions include indicators for region and controls for the share college educated of the White British
population and the share of population classified as middle middle class, lower middle class, and working class/non-
working (with upper middle class as the omitted category). Robust standard errors are reported. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.3: The Impact of South Asian Segregation on Support for the
British National Party
European Parliament UK General
Election 2009 Election 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: BNP Vote Share
D 0.041*** 0.079*** 0.030*** 0.056***
(0.012) (0.028) (0.008) (0.017)
ShareSAsian -0.081*** -0.185*** -0.065*** -0.116***
(0.024) (0.042) (0.012) (0.025)
Specification OLS IV OLS IV
Observations 324 324 573 573
R2 0.549 - 0.328 -
KP First Stage F-Stat - 30 - 56
AR Wald F-Test P-Value - 0.0000 - 0.0000
Panel B: First Stage for Column 2 Column 4
D ShareS Asian D ShareS Asian
D̂ 0.800*** 0.151*** 0.824*** 0.211***
(0.082) (0.040) (0.058) (0.043)
ŜhareSAsian 0.316** 0.865*** 0.135 0.996***
(0.139) (0.101) (0.099) (0.101)
Observations 346 346 573 573
R2 0.354 0.548 0.322 0.556
SW First Stage F-Stat 67 50 127 84
Region Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Panel A of this table reports estimates of Equation 3.3 where the BNP
vote share is regressed on the dissimilarity index and population share of the
South Asian ethnic group, respectively. Columns 1 and 2 report the results for
the European Parliament Election at the LAD level for England while columns
3 and 4 reports results for the UK General Election at the constituency level;
columns 1 and 3 provide OLS specifications while columns 2 and 4 report the
IV specifications. Panel B reports the results for the corresponding first stage
regressions. All regressions include indicators for region and controls for the share
college educated of the White British population and the share of population
classified as middle middle class, lower middle class, and working class/non-
working (with upper middle class as the omitted category). Robust standard
errors are reported. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
90
Table 3.4: Ethnic Segregation and Support for the UK Independence
Party
Vote Share for UKIP
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3)










Observations 324 324 324
R2 0.547 0.478 0.528
KP First Stage F-Stat 30
AR Wald F-Test P-Value 0.0000









Observations 573 573 573
R2 0.132 0.120 0.131
KP First Stage F-Stat 56
AR Wald F-Test P-Value 0.0021
Region Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table reports estimates of Equation 3.3 where
the UKIP vote share is regressed on the dissimilarity index
for and population share of a given ethnic minority group.
Panel A reports results for the European Parliament Elec-
tion at the LAD level for England while Panel B reports re-
sults for the UK General Election at the constituency level.
All regressions include indicators for region and controls for
the share college educated of the White British population
and the share of population classified as middle middle class,
lower middle class, and working class/non-working (with up-
per middle class as the omitted category). Columns 1 and
3 provide the OLS and IV specifications, respectively, when
considering the dissimilarity and population share of South
Asians while column 2 provides the OLS specification when
considering the dissimilarity and population share of White
Europeans. Robust standard errors are reported. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
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Table 3.5: Robustness of Segregation Effect on Support for the British
National Party
BNP Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
D 0.079*** 0.066** 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.076**
(0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031)
ShareSAsian -0.185*** -0.166*** -0.204*** -0.186*** -0.219***
(0.042) (0.044) (0.042) (0.041) (0.046)
Share Middle Middle Class -0.196*** -0.277*** -0.532*** -0.516*** -0.543***
(0.070) (0.074) (0.087) (0.082) (0.088)
Share Lower Middle Class -0.306*** -0.396*** -0.299*** -0.260*** -0.224***
(0.069) (0.074) (0.083) (0.078) (0.080)
Share Working Class and Non-Working -0.050 -0.138*** -0.352*** -0.387*** -0.394***
(0.036) (0.042) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064)
Share W British College Educ. -0.375*** -0.256*** -0.320*** -0.302*** -0.286***
(0.044) (0.081) (0.084) (0.076) (0.077)
Share College Educated -0.278** -0.283** -0.296*** -0.324***
(0.124) (0.112) (0.106) (0.109)
Standard Dev. Neighborhood College Educ. 0.032 -0.009 -0.031 -0.039
(0.048) (0.045) (0.047) (0.047)
Population Density 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Share Rural Population -0.019* -0.022** -0.018
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)




Observations 324 324 324 324 324
KP First Stage F-Stat 30 27 25 25 25
AR Wald F-Test P-Value 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Region Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rural/Urban Classes No No Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table reports estimates of Equation 3.3 where the BNP vote share in the 2009 European Par-
liament is regressed on the dissimilarity index for and population share of the South Asian ethnic group.
Column 1 provides the baseline specification, including indicators for region, the share college educated
of the White British population, controls for the share of population classified as middle middle class,
lower middle class, and working class/non-working (with upper middle class as the omitted category).
Columns 2 through 5 then add controls for broad educational attainment (share college educated of the
total population and the standard deviation of college educated share across neighborhoods), rural/urban
measures (population density, rural population share, rural/urban classification indicators), the popula-
tion share living in public housing, and polarization (a measure of ethnic diversity), respectively. Robust




Solving the Model For Drought
Declaration Allocations
A.0.1 Generalizing Voters’ Preferences to Governing Period t
During the first governing period t = 1, the ruling party makes declaration allocations







The probability of a voter of type i voting for the ruling party candidate in a given
governing period t is












s + θ(dt)rt + ζ(vt−1) otherwise.
In all periods, I assume that the combined effect of the external shocks ε and tempo-
rary shifts θ(·) and ζ(·) is within the bounds necessary to avoid a corner solution (the
third case above). With this assumption, the probability of a voter of type i voting
for the ruling party in the election that follows the first governing period is






+ θ(d1)r1 + ζ(v0) + ε2.
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and the second election vote share can be rewritten as
v2 = v0 + θ(d1)r1 + ζ(v0) + ε2.
In the absence of declarations (r1 = 0) and an incumbency advantage/disadvantage
(ζ(v0) = 0), the expected vote share in the second election is simply the vote share
in the prior election.
Because the changes in support due to declarations and ruling-party incumbency only
last one period while the common shock to voter preferences εt is permanent, after the
second election occurs we have σ3i = ϕi + δiε
2 in governing period t = 3. Therefore,
for any governing period t ∈ {1, 3, 5, ...}, σi can be thought of as voter i’s updated
baseline support for the current ruling party r and can be written as




with ε0 = 0 and, again, εt = 0 for t ∈ {1, 3, 5, ...}. Then, generalizing to any governing
period t ∈ {1, 3, 5, ...} the probability of a voter of type i voting for the ruling party
in the following election is









εs + θ(dt)rt + ζ(vt−1) + εt+1
and the vote share for the ruling party is
vt+1 = v0 +
t∑
s=0
εs + θ(dt)rt + ζ(vt−1) + εt+1.
Iterating the right-hand-side of the above equation forward, I find
vt+1 =vt−1 − L(dt−2, rt−2, vt−3) + θ(dt)rt + ζ(vt−1) + εt+1.
The function L accounts for the impact of temporary shifts in support for the ruling
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party due to incumbency and declarations,
L(dt−2, rt−2, vt−3) = [θ(dt−2)rt−2 + ζ(vt−3)]×
[
1{p = pt−3} − 1{p 6= pt−3}
]
.
Because the transitory shift in voters’ preferences due to prior declarations and in-
cumbency is relative to the ruling party pt−3, the above equation adjusts for a past
positive shift for the ruling party pt−3 having increased (decreased) the vote share
vt−1 if the ruling party is the same (different) in governing period t.
A.0.2 Solving the Ruling Party’s Allocation Decision
Imposing that ε is within the bounds defining the third case of the above equation











− L(dt−2, rt−2, vt−3) + ζ(vt−1)
)
≥ ηt,
The ruling party compares the difference in the likelihood of winning the upcoming
election with a declaration to the likelihood of winning in the absence of a declaration
to determine whether the resulting change in expected electoral success exceeds the
marginal cost of a declaration. As described in Section 1.3, I will restate the above
equation in terms of the ruling party’s vote margin, instead of vote share, and impose













In the remaining sections, I consider comparative statics for this decision rule.
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Parameter for Voter Response to Declarations and Drought
I first consider the affect of marginal changes in the parameter value θ(dt) on the
return to a drought declaration. Taking the derivative of the decision rule with






mt−1 − L(dt−2, rt−2, vt−3) + θ(dt) + ζ(vt−1))2
2ν2
} > 0,
so that the marginal return is increasing in the size of the positive preference shift
due to a declaration. The assumptions that drought is a negative wealth shock and
voters have increasing and concave utility results in voters’ marginal utility from a
declaration being greater when a drought has occurred. As stated previously, I then
allow this increased marginal utility for drought-affected voters to translate into a
more positive shift in preferences for the ruling party, or θ(1) > θ(0). This combined
with the above result suggests that the marginal return to a drought declaration
is higher for drought-affected areas. Further, because the ruling party will provide
declarations to the constituencies with a marginal return above the marginal cost ηt,
this indicates that declaration likelihood will be higher in drought-affected areas.
Ruling Party’s Vote Margin
The ruling party’s vote margin in the election that precedes the governing period is
a strong signal for how the ruling party will perform in the next election. Taking the
derivative of the marginal return to a declaration with respect to the vote margin





















This derivative equals 0 at a vote margin m̄ = −[θ(dt)−2L(dt−2, rt−2, vt−3)+2ζ(vt−1)],
which is the return-maximizing vote margin for allocating a declaration. Because the
marginal return to providing a declaration is single-peaked, the return to allocating
a declaration is declining for vote margins larger than or smaller than the return-
maximizing margin. In turn, this suggests that the likelihood of receiving a drought
declaration is also declining for increasingly higher, or lower, vote margins.
According to the model θ > 0 and so imposing no incumbency advantage/disadvan-
tage (ζ = 0) and no lagged declaration impacts, the return-maximizing vote margin
will occur at a negative prior vote margin, m̄ = θ(dt) < 0. This simplified scenario
is shown in Figure A.0.1 in the case that a drought occurs and the case in which
no drought occurs in t. In this scenario, for a given magnitude of the vote margin,
|mt−1|, the return to allocating a declaration will be higher in non-aligned constituen-
cies where mt−1 < 0. Also, as long as the the return maximizing vote margin, or the
shift in support due to a declaration, is not too large, the return to a declaration will
be decreasing in the absolute value of the ruling party’s prior vote margin (a linear
approximation to the relationship shown in the figure). The model imposes that the
shift in support is in fact less than 10 percent.
Incumbency Advantage/Disadvantage
The most decisive impact of the incumbency effect is the discontinuity it creates in the
marginal return to a declaration at a vote margin of 0. As shown above in the equation
for the ruling party’s decision rule, the probability of winning the election in t + 1
changes discontinuously at 0 due to the fact that in places previously won (mt−1 > 0)
support for the ruling party is increased by ζ, with ζ > 0 representing an incumbency
advantage. This results in a discontinuity in the marginal return to a declaration, as
shown in Figure A.0.2, that is negative (positive) moving from aligned to non-aligned
constituencies in the case of an incumbency advantage (disadvantage) relative to a
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smooth curve in the case of no incumbency effect. Another way to visualize this
discontinuity, as shown in Figure A.0.2, an incumbency advantage (disadvantage)
takes the baseline curve for the marginal return to a declaration and shifts it towards
(away from) a vote margin of 0 for aligned areas.
Also shown in the figure, identifying this discontinuity in the marginal return to a
drought declaration may not be possible using the empirically observable declaration
likelihood. For the scenarios shown in the figure, a constituency with a vote margin
close to 0 will receive a declaration regardless of whether it is aligned or non-aligned
(because the ruling party targets competitive constituencies). Therefore, the discon-
tinuity will only be estimated in empirical specifications if there are situations where
the marginal cost ηt is high enough that aligned areas are favored over non-aligned
areas (or vice-versa) even when elections are close; such a scenario can be seen in the
figure if we consider a ruling incumbency advantage (e.g., ζ = .1) depicted with a
green dashed line and a marginal cost ηt > .12, so a horizontal line just above the
blue dotted line in the figure. On the other hand, the figure does show that while a
discontinuity may not be estimable in the observed data, the incumbency effect has
implications for the average effect of alignment. If an incumbency advantage exists,
the asymmetry in the marginal return to a declaration is accentuated so that aligned
areas will be less likely to receive a drought declaration than non-aligned areas; for
a given magnitude of the vote margin, |mt−1|, the difference in the marginal return
to a drought declaration between aligned and non-aligned areas is increased. With
an incumbency disadvantage, if ζ is large, aligned areas may become more likely to
receive a declaration than non-aligned areas as the difference in the marginal return
to a drought declaration between aligned and non-aligned areas at a given magnitude
of the vote margin is decreased and even switches signs.
Figure A.0.2 also shows how the return-maximizing vote margin varies with an in-
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cumbency effect. Comparing an incumbency advantage to the results with no incum-
bency effect, the return-maximizing vote margin will still occur at −[θ(dt)] in non-
aligned constituencies but now in aligned constituencies it will occur at −[θ(dt) + 2ζ]
if −[θ(dt) + 2ζ] > 0, or the advantage is sufficiently large; in other words, an incum-
bency advantage could cause the decision rule to become bimodal. An incumbency
disadvantage does not change the return-maximizing vote margin. Again, assum-
ing the incumbency effect is not too large in magnitude, the marginal return to a
drought declaration will increase in electoral competition. The figure also displays
the marginal cost of providing a declaration, ηt, which the ruling party considers in
its decision rule; again, ηt represents the marginal cost in the N th constituency and so
it will shift depending upon the shift in the marginal return to a declaration caused
by the incumbency effect.
In the remaining section, I impose an incumbency advantage and consider the impact
of prior declarations and prior incumbency advantage on the relationship between the
marginal return to a drought declaration and the ruling party’s vote margin.
Accounting for Prior Incumbency Effects
As shown in the equation for the ruling party’s decision rule above, the prior in-
cumbency effects shift the value of the marginal return over the distribution of the
vote margin and therefore the return-maximizing vote margin for the ruling party,
m̄ = −[θ(dt) − 2L(dt−2, rt−2, vt−3) + 2ζ(vt−1)]. An incumbency advantage following
the election t−3 temporarily increased support for the then ruling party r′ in election
t − 1 for aligned constituencies; therefore, to estimate support for the ruling party
p in t the vote share/margin must be adjusted downward if p = pt−3 and upward
otherwise (with opposite effects for non-aligned constituencies). While here I assume
an incumbency advantage, in general the prior incumbency effect depends on: (1)
whether an incumbency advantage or disadvantage exists, (2) the party identity of
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the ruling party in each period, and (3) whether the constituency was aligned after
the t−3 election. These variations, however, can be collapsed into two cases: in some
constituencies the ruling party p will have been benefited from the incumbency effect
in election t − 1 and in others the current ruling party was disadvantaged. Figure
A.0.3 plots the ruling party’s decision rule, for example parameter values, for the
case where there is no prior incumbency effect and the cases where a constituency
was advantaged or disadvantaged by a prior incumbency effect (assuming no prior
declaration effect). As shown, the inclusion of prior incumbency effects shifts the
return-maximizing vote margin along the distribution of prior ruling party vote mar-
gins. This prior-incumbency-induced shift reduces the marginal return to providing a
declaration for some margins mt−1 and increases it for others. Further, the prevailing
marginal cost of a declaration ηt, shown in the figure, assumes all constituencies fall
into one of the given cases and, given these parameter values, happens to be the same
in each case. In reality, however, different constituencies will be either advantaged or
disadvantaged by past incumbency effects and so the marginal cost ηt will depend on
the observed marginal returns to a declaration in the observed constituencies.
Accounting for Prior Declaration Effects
Next, I assume no prior incumbency effect and focus on the variation induced by prior
declaration effects. The effect of a prior declaration depends of course on whether a
constituency received a declaration and whether or not the ruling party is the same
in both elections. A declaration in t− 2 temporarily increased support for the ruling
party pt−3 relative to the opposition party in election t − 1; and so, to assess sup-
port for the ruling party r in governing period t the vote share/margin needs to be
adjusted downwards if p = pt−3 and upwards otherwise in constituencies that previ-
ously received a declaration. Figure A.0.4 plots the ruling party’s decision rule for
the case where there was no prior declaration and the cases where a prior declaration
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occurred and either advantaged or disadvantaged the current ruling party in election
t − 1 (imposing no prior incumbency effect). Again, the marginal cost to providing
a declaration ηt assumes all constituencies fall into one of the 3 cases shown and
happens to be the same marginal cost in each case for the given set of parameter
values. However, the marginal cost will depend on the number of constituencies that
did in fact receive a declaration in t − 2 and whether it benefited or disadvantaged
the ruling party p in election t− 1.
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Figure A.0.1: The Marginal Return to Drought Declaration by Ruling
Party’s Vote Margin
Note: This figure depicts the marginal return to a drought declaration and marginal
cost to a declaration, as described in Equation 1.3, for different possible values of
the ruling party’s (first election) vote margin. For exposition, I fix ε ∼ N(0, .04).
This figure assumes no incumbency effects and no shifts in support due to prior
incumbency or prior declarations. The plot is split by a vertical line where the
ruling party’s vote margin is equal to zero: non-aligned constituencies fall to the
left of the line while aligned constituencies fall to the right of the line. The figure
plots the marginal return in the case where no drought has occurred (θ(0) = .08,
solid black line) and a drought has occurred (θ(1) = .1, dashed blue line). The
return-maximizing vote margin, m̄(dt), in each case is highlighted by a vertical line
and point on the curve. The marginal cost to providing a declaration, ηt, is shown
as a dashed red line. According to the model, areas with a vote margin at which the
marginal return to a declaration exceeds the marginal cost will receive a declaration.
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Figure A.0.2: The Marginal Return to Drought Declaration with
Incumbency Effects
Note: This figure plots the marginal return to a drought declaration curve, as
described by the left-hand side of Equation 1.3, for different possible values of the
ruling party’s (first election) vote margin; likewise, the figure includes the marginal
cost of a declaration (left-hand side of Equation 1.3) represented by horizontal lines
in the figure. This figure assumes θ(1) = θ(0) and no shifts in support due to prior
incumbency or prior declarations. For exposition, I consider 2,001 points along the
ruling party’s vote margin distribution and fix ε ∼ N(0, .04), and θ = .08, and
N t = 800. The plot is split by a vertical line where the ruling party’s vote margin
is equal to zero: non-aligned constituencies fall to the left of the line while aligned
constituencies fall to the right of the line. The figure plots the marginal return and
associated marginal cost in the case with no incumbency advantage/disadvantage
(ζ = 0, solid black line), an incumbency advantage (ζ = .1, dashed green line), and
an incumbency disadvantage (ζ = −.1, dotted blue line).
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Figure A.0.3: The Marginal Return to Drought Declaration with
Prior Incumbency Effects
Note: This figure plots the marginal return to a drought declaration, as described
by the left-hand side of Equation 1.3, for different possible values of the ruling
party’s (first election) vote margin; likewise, the figure includes the marginal cost
of a declaration (left-hand side of Equation 1.3) represented by a horizontal line in
the figure. This figure assumes θ(1) = θ(0) and no shifts in support due to prior
declarations. For exposition, I consider 2,001 points along the ruling party’s vote
margin distribution and fix ε ∼ N(0, .04), θ = .08, ζ = .1 (incumbency advantage),
and N t = 800. The plot is split by a vertical line where the ruling party’s vote
margin is equal to zero: non-aligned constituencies fall to the left of the line while
aligned constituencies fall to the right of the line. The figure plots the marginal re-
turn and associated marginal cost in the case with no prior (or lagged) incumbency
effect (solid black line), an incumbency effect that benefited the current ruling party
in the past election (dashed green line), and an incumbency effect that disadvan-
taged the current ruling party in the past election (dotted blue line). With the
given parameters and assuming all constituencies fall into one of the three cases,
the marginal cost happens to be the same in each case and is therefore only plotted
once (dashed red line).
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Figure A.0.4: The Marginal Return to Drought Declaration with
Prior Declaration Effects
Note: This figure plots the marginal return to a drought declaration, as described
by the left-hand side of Equation 1.3, for different possible values of the ruling
party’s (first election) vote margin; likewise, the figure includes the marginal cost
of a declaration (left-hand side of Equation 1.3) represented by a horizontal line in
the figure. This figure assumes θ(1) = θ(0) and no shifts in support due to prior
incumbency. For exposition, I consider 2,001 points along the ruling party’s vote
margin distribution and fix ε ∼ N(0, .04), θ = .08, ζ = .1 (incumbency advantage),
and N t = 800. The plot is split by a vertical line where the ruling party’s vote
margin is equal to zero: non-aligned constituencies fall to the left of the line while
aligned constituencies fall to the right of the line. The figure plots the marginal
return in the case with no prior (or lagged) incumbency effect (solid black line),
a declaration that benefited the current ruling party in the past election (dashed
green line), and a declaration that disadvantaged the current ruling party in the
past election (dotted blue line). With the given parameters and assuming all con-
stituencies fall into one of the three cases, the marginal cost happens to be the same




B.0.1 Block and District Names
The spelling of the names of Indian districts and blocks varies across the sources of
data used in Chapters 1 and 2. In order to match geographic units across data sources,
I use exact name matches between any two data sources. For blocks, I use the state
name, district name, and block name in the matching process as block names may be
repeated across districts within a single state. Likewise, in the matching for district
names I also use the state name. I then determine which blocks (or districts) in each
data source are not paired and review each of the individual cases. In most cases,
the lack of a match is due to a simple variation in spelling that can be adjusted by
comparing the unmatched units. In a few cases, the name of a block’s headquarters
is listed instead of the name of the block itself and so I identify the correct match in
these instances through web searches on the administrative units.
B.0.2 Official Drought Declarations Data
I construct a block-level panel dataset of official drought declarations for the period
2008 to 2019 for Karnataka and 2009 to 2019 for Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.
The Karnataka State Natural Disaster Monitoring Centre (KSNDMC) provided a list
of declarations for the full period except for the 2019 season, for which data comes
from an official drought declaration publication. The Telangana State Development
Planning Society (TSDPS) provided a list of official drought declarations for the full
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period at the block level as well. Annual lists of drought declarations for the blocks in
Andhra Pradesh are collected from official drought declaration documents, except for
the year 2013. Data for 2013 is based on a state report listing the number of blocks
per district that received a declaration. For 7 districts no blocks received a declaration
and in 1 district all blocks received a declaration; for these 8 districts, I am able to
code the declaration indicator. However, for 5 districts a subset of blocks received
declarations but I do not observe which blocks and so the declaration indicator is set
to missing for 2013.
B.0.3 Political Data
The Election Commission of India (2019) and Bhavnani (2014) provide data on state
Legislative Assembly elections in Andhra Pradesh/Telangana and Karnataka. From
this data, I construct the two measures described in Section 1.2.2 as well as voter
turnout and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of vote shares. In order to con-
nect this constituency-level political data to the block-level declaration and environ-
mental data, block boundaries must be mapped to the political boundaries. I map
blocks to 2008-boundary assembly constituencies using information provided in the
delimitation documentation for each state (Election Commission of India, 2008).1 In
my sample of matched blocks-constituencies, about 92 percent of blocks map to a
single constituency while the remaining blocks map to two or more constituencies.
Therefore, to construct block-level political variables, for each block b in year t, I take








1Based on available data, I was unable to match blocks in Hyderabad, Telangana to constituencies
and so these blocks are excluded from the analysis; however, these are blocks that are not subject
to drought declarations during the period of analysis.
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Note, the aligned indicator at the block level is then an indicator that the average
ruling party’s vote margin was greater than 0.
Instrument Construction
In addition to the mapping described above, a second mapping is needed for in-
strument construction between 2008-boundary assembly constituencies and the 2004-
boundary constituencies (the latter set of boundaries were actually designated in
1976). This constituency-to-constituency mapping is made using the delimitation
documents Election Commission of India (1976) and Election Commission of India
(2008) as well as a mapping provided by Iyer and Reddy (2013).2
Using this second mapping allows for the construction of an instrument based on
information from the pre-delimitation, 2004 election. The goal of this instrument is to
estimate the counterfactual vote margin, or what voters’ support for each party would
be if unaffected by local unobserved factors that also influence future declarations.
However, an issue with using information from the 2004 election to estimate support
for the ruling and opposition parties is that some of the parties from the 2008/9,
2013/14, and 2018/19 elections either did not exist in 2004 or did not run in all
constituencies that they would later contest. Assigning a value of 0 for such a party-
constituency observation would lead to a predicted vote share of 0 and so the vote
margin would simply reflect the vote share of the remaining party, assuming that
the party ran in 2004. Even in the case where a party did exist in 2004, it may
have had support in a given constituency but not contested the election because a
coalition partner was running or the party did not anticipate sufficient support to
win. Instead of assigning 0 baseline support, I assign the mean value of observed
2004 vote shares for ruling party and opposition party-constituency pairs; I chose the
2For a number of constituencies located in Bangalore, I am unable to construct a mapping between
2004-boundary and 2008-boundary constituencies so blocks that map to these constituencies are
dropped from the sample.
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mean as it might be representative of how the party would have done had it run.
For ruling and opposition party-constituency observations that can be matched to a
2004 vote share the mean vote share is .36 (.35 for opposition parties only and .38 for
ruling parties only). As a robustness check, in Appendix Table C.0.5 I instead assign
the first quartile value for the vote share of .28 (column 2) or the third quartile value
of .46 (column 3). First, the result that declaration likelihood is decreasing in the
absolute value of the vote margin is robust across these two alternative specifications.
Second, the magnitude of the coefficient is larger than the OLS coefficient in all cases,
though the magnitudes vary depending on which value is assigned for unobserved vote
shares.
I also create there alternative instruments to study the robustness of the main find-
ings. For the first, I increase the leave-out in the state-level shift in voters’ support
for a party to drop all constituencies located in the same district. Second, in order to
construct an instrument in which all temporal change from nearby constituencies is
removed from the shift factor, I utilize a publicly available map of modern constituen-
cies. I find the centroid for each constituency polygon and identify all other centroids
that lie within a 100 km radius (and the same state). Third, I reconstruct the in-
strument using data from the 1999 election, applying the same adjustment described
above, for parties that did not run in a given constituency in 1999.
B.0.4 Environmental Data
I use the India Meteorological Department’s .25x.25 gridded rainfall data from Pai et
al. (2014) and the .5◦-by-.5◦ gridded, model-calculated average monthly soil moisture
for van den Dool et al. (2003).3 In order to transition this gridded data to block-level
variables, I use shapefiles for blocks in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh/Telangana.4
3CPC Soil Moisture data is provided by the NOAA/OAR/ESRL PSD, Boulder, Colorado, USA.
4The shapefile used for Karnataka was provided by Professor Ashwini Chhatre while the shapefile
for Andhra Pradesh/Telangana is from ML InfoMaps.
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To get the block-level averages, I first reproject the gridded data to Cylindrical Equal
Area, then convert the raster to a polygon and intersect it with the shapefiles (also
re-projected to Cylindrical Equal Area). I use the area of each intersected polygon
within a block to get the area-weighted average of rainfall or mean soil moisture.
Due to the fact that the IMD rainfall is available for grid points that fall on land
only, some blocks located on the coast are not completely covered by a rainfall grid
polygon; for these blocks, I use the area-weighted average for the overlap. For four
blocks for which there is no overlap, I use the average rainfall for a neighbouring
block.
The normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI) data is provided on a per pixel
basis, with a spatial resolution of 1 kilometer, for each of nine 16-day periods that
overlap the primary (Kharif) growing season (Didan, 2015). To construct the NDVI
for each block and 16-day period, I first convert the pixels to a gridded (raster)
dataset and re-project the gridded data into Cylindrical Equal Area. I then overlap
the block-level polygons with the NDVI gridded data and take the average of all
points that fall within the block. The NDVI gridded data is very dense and so taking
an area-weighted average of all points within a block (as is done for rainfall and soil
moisture) for each 16-week period in the 12 years in this sample would be a very
data-intensive process. The non-area-weighted average is instead used because it is
calculable within a reasonable timeframe; however, because of the density of data
points for NDVI, taking an area-weighted average might not be as important as for
gridded datasets with more sparsely available data.
The guidelines offer specific variables and cutoffs that can be used for the soil moisture
and NDVI data in order to generate indicators needed for meeting the sufficient
condition for a declaration, particularly in the more recent drought manual. However,
instead of generating indicator variables, I use the block-level average of NDVI for
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the nine 16-day periods and monthly mean soil moisture for the 4 months of the main
agricultural season discussed above to flexibly control for soil moisture and vegetation.
To account for variation in hydrological indices, I focus on groundwater levels and
utilize monthly, district-level data (NWIC, 2020). The groundwater level data is not
available at the block level or for all months, but is available for most districts in
May and August. These months are also of particular relevance because they occur
immediately before the growing season and at the end of the season, giving a sense
of the variation in groundwater over the full season. I use annual district-level gross
area irrigated as data is not available at the block level (DAC&FW, 2021); data is
only available for Karnataka in 2018 and all three states in 2019.
I use data on agricultural production at the district level, which includes the crop
area sown (in hectares) and production (in tonnes) by crop and agricultural season
(DAC&FW, 2020). For crop area sown, the drought manual suggests that an indicator
can be formed for area sown being less than 50 percent of total cultivable area (DAC,
2009). Again, data for crop area sown is only available at the district level and for the
years 2008 to 2018. Because district boundaries in Karnataka and Telangana changed
between 2008 and 2018, I combine districts that split post 2008 into the original 2008
district.5 Instead of generating the measure suggested in the manual, which requires
information on cultivable land, I generate the ratio of the total area sown in the main
agricultural season (the Kharif season) for a given year to the average total area sown
during the season for the years 2008 through 2018; this measure is meant to capture
how area sown in a given year varies from that of a normal year, measured as the
average over the period.6
5For three of Telangana’s newly formed districts (Jangaon, Vikarabad, and Siddipet) the district
was formed from two or three 2008-districts and so I assign the crop area statistics to the primary
district from which it was separated.
6For the six districts in Telangana from which Jangaon, Vikarabad, and Siddipet districts were
separated, my measure of total crop area necessarily changes in 2016 because I only assign the
newly-formed district to the primary 2008-district. However, when running the regression in column
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I also use this district-level data in the analysis of the impacts of drought and decla-
rations on agricultural production. To do so, I also create measures of the share of
cropped area sown that is devoted to each crop or crop group for each district-year.7
Because rainfall indicators are the primary measure for determining declarations,
I take the block-level area-weighted averages and construct indicators for drought-
affected areas. According to the 2009 guidelines, the primary criteria for a drought
declaration in the primary agricultural season is met if (1) the total rainfall for the
early season (June and July) is below 50 percent of normal (with or without a dry
spell) or (2) the full-season rainfall (June to September) is below 75 percent of normal.
To construct these indices, I start by constructing the ratio of current rainfall to the
long-term-average rainfall, or
ratioperiod =
current total rainfall in given period
long-term-average rainfall for given period
for the relevant period of months or weeks.8 Here a ratio of 1 indicates that the block
received normal or average rainfall while a ratio less than (greater than) 1 indicates
below-average (above-average) rainfall. I use these ratios themselves as continuous
controls for rainfall in some specifications and also combine the ratios with cutoffs
specified in the guidelines to create indicator variables. The indicator for drought-
affected blocks used in Chapters 1 and 2 is then,
droughtbt = 1{ratioESbt < .5 ∨ ratioFSbt < .75}.
7 of Table 1.5, where this crop area sown ratio is used as a control, I can also include an indicator
for being in one of these six districts post 2016 and the interaction between the area ratio and the
indicator and it does not significantly impact the results. The coefficient on the absolute value of
the ruling party’s vote margin becomes -.772 (s.e. .242) as opposed to -.766 (s.e. .244).
7I include shares for individual crops including cotton, dry chilies, black pepper, ginger, coriander,
tumeric, arecanut, niger seed, tobacco, cashew nut, sugarcane, tapioca, and mesta. For the remaining
crops, I include shares for crop groups: millets, grain, oilseeds, fruit, vegtables and tubers, or pulses
and legumes.
8The long-term-average should consider 30 prior years, as a minimum. For a given year t, I take
the average rainfall over the period 1998 to t− 1.
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While this indicator is proscribed by the national guidelines for the majority of the
sample period, there are other indicators of drought that might be used by state
governments during the period. For example, during part of the sample period, official
drought declarations in Andhra Pradesh/Telangana cite an alternative, state-specific
cutoff for the full-season rainfall ratio: .75 for areas where normal rainfall is above
1000 millimeters; .80 where normal rainfall is 750-999.9 millimeters; and .85 where
normal rainfall is below 750 millimeters (GoAP, 2013). I take the baseline drought
indicator, described in the previous paragraph, and adjust the full-season criteria for
Andhra Pradesh/Telanga to create an alternative indicator droughtAPbt . Further, the
2016 national guidelines add an additional criteria, based on dry spells, to the two
listed above to define the necessary condition for a drought declaration. According
to the guidelines, dry spell is defined as 3-4 weeks of consecutive rainfall below 50%
of normal following the onset of the monsoon. I do not attempt to estimate the
beginning of the monsoon in each year, instead I create an indicator that takes a
value of one if ratioWeek is less than .5 for any consecutive 4 weeks during June to
September.9 Again, I construct an alternative indicator for drought-affected blocks
that takes the baseline indicator and changes the value to one if the ratiois less than
.5 for any consecutive 4-week period, droughtDSbt . Appendix Table C.0.6 provides the
results of estimating Equation 1.4 using each of the alternative drought indicators.
While there are some small differences in the coefficient on the absolute value of the
ruling party’s vote margin, the results are robust to these alternative definitions of
drought.
Finally, to identify blocks that might be considered urban, I use the harmonized
nighttime lights dataset provided by Li et al. (2020) and overlay each image with
block-level polygons. I then take an area-weighted average of data points as the
9Also, prior to the change in guidelines, the Karnataka state government used rainfall deficiency,
soil moisture, and more than 4 weeks of dry spell to determine drought declarations (GoK, 2016).
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block-level night lights value. I consider a block to be urban if its night lights in 2008
was above the 95th percentile for all blocks in the sample.
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Appendix C
Additional Tables and Figures
















Constituency FE Yes Yes
Election FE Yes Yes
Note: This table reports regressions of observed
political variables on constructed political vari-
ables for each stage of instrument construction
(see Section 1.4.1) at the constituency-election
level. All specifications include constituency and
election fixed effects. Column 1 reports results
for a regression of observed vote shares on con-
structed vote shares for the ruling party and main
opposition in each constituency. Columns 2 pro-
vides an estimation of the regression of the ruling
party’s vote margin on the constructed vote mar-
gin. The F-statistic for the constructed instru-
ment is reported. Standard errors are clustered
by constituency. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote statistical signif-
icance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table C.0.2: Drought Declarations and Political Motivations, Alter-
native Functional Form
Declarationbt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
droughtbt 0.227*** 0.192*** 0.222*** 0.186***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
marginc(b)e(t) -0.031 -0.013 -0.107 -0.098
(0.025) (0.024) (0.115) (0.113)
margin2c(b)e(t) -0.427*** -0.404*** -1.771*** -1.711**
(0.094) (0.095) (0.662) (0.697)
Observations 14,043 14,043 14,043 14,043
KP First Stage F-Stat 7 6
AR Wald F-Test P-Value 0.0002 0.0006
Specification OLS OLS IV IV
Block and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Declarations Yes No Yes No
State-Year FE No Yes No Yes
Note: This table reports an estimation similar to Equation 1.4 but the
indicator for block b receiving a drought declaration in year t is regressed
on the a quadratic in the ruling party’s vote margin (instead of the abso-
lute value) and an indicator for drought occurrence (OLS specification in
columns 1 and 2 and IV specifications in columns 3 and 4). Table C.0.3
displays the results of the first stage regressions for each of the endogenous
variables in the IV regressions shown in columns 2 and 3. All specifica-
tions include block and year fixed effects while columns 1 and 3 include
the leave-one-out state total number of declarations and columns 2 and 4
include state-year fixed effects. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic
for the IV specification and the p-value for the Anderson-Rubin Wald F
test are reported. Standard errors are clustered by constituency-election.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
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Table C.0.3: Drought Declarations and Political Motivations, First
Stage for Alternative Functional Form






m̃arginc(b)e(t) 0.275*** -0.014* 0.282*** -0.011
(0.035) (0.008) (0.034) (0.009)
m̃argin
2
c(b)e(t) -0.630*** 0.261*** -0.769*** 0.238***
(0.169) (0.063) (0.170) (0.067)
droughtbt 0.002 -0.003*** -0.000 -0.004***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Observations 14,043 14,043 14,043 14,043
R2 0.399 0.595 0.436 0.603
SW First Stage F-Stat 31 13 30 12
Block FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Declarations Yes Yes No No
State-Year FE No No Yes Yes
Note: This table displays the results of the first stage regressions for the IV regressions
in Table C.0.2 for the ruling party’s vote margin and the square of the ruling party’s vote
margin. The instrument construction for the ruling party’s vote margin is explained in
Section 1.4.1. All specifications include block and year fixed effects while columns 1 and 2
include the leave-one-out state total number of declarations and columns 3 and 4 include
state-year fixed effects. The Sanderson-Windmeijer first stage F-statistics are reported for
each of the endogenous variables. Standard errors are clustered by constituency-election. ∗,
∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table C.0.4: Planned Relief Expenditures Relative to Drought Oc-
currence/Severity
Planned Relief Expenditures








∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 100 100 100 100
R2 0.291 0.294 0.613 0.616
District FE No No Yes Yes
Note: This table uses data on planned relief expenditures for agricultural,
horticultural, and animal husbandry subsidies in 2018 for blocks located
in Karnataka (GoK, 2018). The table reports the results of specifications
where the dependent variable is the amount of planned relief expenditure (in
100,000,000 rupees) and the independent variables are the geographic area
of the block (in square kilometers) and an indicator for drought occurrence
(column 1) or a quadratic in the ratio of full-season rainfall to is long-term
average (column 2). Columns 3 and 4 repeat the specifications in columns 1
and 2, respectively, but adding district fixed effects. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table C.0.5: Robustness to Alternative Baseline Vote Share Assump-
tions
Declarationbt
Parties Missing a 2004 Vote Share Assigned: Mean 1st Quartile 3rd Quartile
(1) (2) (3)
droughtbt 0.184*** 0.188*** 0.183***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
|margin|c(b)e(t) -0.909** -0.550* -1.079**
(0.382) (0.318) (0.432)
Observations 14,043 14,043 14,043
KP First Stage F-Stat 8 8 7
AR Wald F-Test P-Value 0.0006 0.0470 0.0000
Block Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Yes Yes Yes
Note: Panel A of this table reports IV estimations of Equation 1.4, where the indicator
for block b receiving a drought declaration in year t is regressed on the absolute value
of the ruling party’s vote margin and an indicator for drought occurrence. Column 1
reports the specification with the baseline instrument, where parties that did not run
in a constituency in 2004 are assigned the mean observed vote share. Columns 2 and
3 instead use an instrument where the first quartile and third quartile, respectively, of
the observed vote shares is assigned to those parties. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
F statistic for the endogenous variable and the p-value for the Anderson-Rubin Wald
F test are reported. Standard errors are clustered by constituency-election. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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|margin|c(b)e(t) -0.909** -0.882** -0.997**
(0.382) (0.382) (0.402)
Observations 14,043 14,043 14,043
KP First Stage F-Stat 8 7 8
AR Wald F-Test P-Value 0.0006 0.0009 0.0004
Block Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table reports IV estimations of Equation 1.4,
where the indicator for block b receiving a drought declara-
tion in year t is regressed on the absolute value of the rul-
ing party’s vote margin and an indicator for drought occur-
rence. Column 1 utilizes the baseline indicator for drought
while columns 2 and 3 use alternative indicators for drought-
affected blocks described in Appendix B. The Kleibergen-
Paap Wald rk F statistic for the endogenous variable and the
p-value for the Anderson-Rubin Wald F test are reported.
Standard errors are clustered by constituency-election. ∗,




Abay, K. A., Berhane, G., Hoddinott, J., & Tafere, K. (2020, November). COVID-19
and food security in Ethiopia : Do social protection programs protect? (Working
Paper No. WPS9475). World Bank.
Alatas, V., Banerjee, A., Hanna, R., Olken, B. A., & Tobias, J. (2012). Targeting the
poor: Evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia. American Economic Review ,
102 , 1206-1240.
Alesina, A., & Zhuravskaya, E. (2011). Segregation and the quality of government
in a cross section of countries. American Economic Review , 1872-1911.
Allen, C. (2017). Fear and loathing: The political discourse in relation to muslims
and islam in the british contemporary setting. Politics and Religion Journal , 4 (2),
221-236.
Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley
Pub. Co.
Anagol, S., & Fujiwara, T. (2014, June). The runner-up effect (Working Paper No.
20261). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Ananat, E. O., & Washington, E. (2009). Segregation and black political efficacy.
Journal of Public Economics , 93 (5-6), 807–822.
Asher, S., Lunt, T., Matsuura, R., & Novosad, P. (2020, December). Develop-
ment research at high geographic resolution: An analysis of night lights, firms, and
poverty in India using the SHRUG Open Data Platform (Working Paper).
Asher, S., & Novosad, P. (2017, January). Politics and local economic growth: Evi-
dence from India. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics , 9 (1), 229-73.
Retrieved from http://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20150512
doi: 10.1257/app.20150512
Asher, S., & Novosad, P. (2020, March). Rural roads and local economic de-




Azulai, M. (2017, November). Public good allocation and the welfare cost of political
connections: evidence from Brazilian matching grants (Working Paper).
Banful, A. B. (2011). Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms
eliminate politically motivated targeting? evidence from ghana. Journal of Devel-
opment Economics , 96 (2), 380 - 390. Retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect
.com/science/article/pii/S0304387810000969 doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.jdeveco.2010.08.012
Bardhan, P., Mitra, S., Mookherjee, D., & Nath, A. (2020, January). Clientelism and
political manipulation of allocations and votes in West Bengal (Working Paper).
Barone, G., Alessio, D., de Blasio, G., & Naticchioni, P. (2016). Mr. Rossi, Mr. Hu
and politics. the role of immigration in shaping natives’ voting behavior. Journal
of Public Economics , 136 (C), 1-13. Retrieved from https://EconPapers.repec
.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:136:y:2016:i:c:p:1-13
Basurto, M. P., Dupas, P., & Robinson, J. (2020). Decentralization and efficiency
of subsidy targeting: Evidence from chiefs in rural malawi. Journal of Public
Economics , 185 , 104047.
Bazzi, S., Gaduh, A., Rothenberg, A. D., & Wong, M. (2019, November). Unity
in Diversity? How Intergroup Contact Can Foster Nation Building. American
Economic Review , 109 (11), 3978-4025. Retrieved from https://ideas.repec
.org/a/aea/aecrev/v109y2019i11p3978-4025.html
Bera, S., & Sen, S. (2016, May). Frame national drought policy: Supreme
court. liveMint . Retrieved from https://www.livemint.com/Politics/
K40mUpuaDEctugrfHpYyNJ/SC-verdict-on-drought-case-today.html
Besley, T., & Burgess, R. (2002, 11). The Political Economy of Government Respon-
siveness: Theory and Evidence from India*. The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
117 (4), 1415-1451.
Bhavnani, R. R. (2014). India National and State Election Dataset. Harvard
Dataverse. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/26526 doi: 10.7910/
DVN/26526
Biggs, M., & Knauss, S. (2011). Explaining membership in the British National
Party: A multilevel analysis of contact and threat. European Sociological Review ,
28 (5), 633-646.
BJP’s merger and acquisitions gave it the edge in many seats. (2018, May).




Boustan, L. P., Kahn, M. E., Rhode, P. W., & Yanguas, M. L. (2019, June). The
effect of natural disasters on economic activity in us counties: A century of data
(Working Paper No. 23410). National Bureau of Economic Research. Retrieved
from http://www.nber.org/papers/w23410 doi: 10.3386/w23410
Bowyer, B. (2008). Local context and extreme right support in england: The British
National Party in the 2002 and 2003 local elections. Electoral Studies , 27 (4), 611
- 620. Retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0261379408000723 doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2008.05.001
Brunner, B., & Kuhn, A. (2018). Immigration, cultural distance and natives’ at-
titudes towards immigrants: Evidence from Swiss voting results. Kyklos , 71 (1),
28–58.
Burchardi, K. B., Chaney, T., & Hassan, T. A. (2019). Migrants, ancestors, and
investments. The Review of Economic Studies , 86 (4), 1448–1486.
Bursztyn, L., Chaney, T., Hassan, T., & Rao, A. (2021, February). The Immigrant
Next Door: Exposure, Prejudice, and Altruism (NBER Working Paper).
Cain, M. (1981). Risk and insurance: Perspectives on fertility and agrarian change
in India and Bangladesh. Population and Development Review , 7 (3), 435-474.
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1972559
Carpena, F. (2019, May). How do droughts impact household food consumption and
nutritional intake? a study of rural India (Working Paper).
Cole, S. (2009). Fixing market failures or fixing elections? agricultural credit in
India. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics , 1 (1), 219–250. Retrieved
from http://www.jstor.org/stable/25760153
Cole, S., Healy, A., & Werker, E. (2012). Do voters demand responsive governments?
evidence from Indian disaster relief. Journal of Development Economics , 97 (2),
167 - 181. Retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S0304387811000502 doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2011.05.005
Copsey, N. (2007). Changing course or changing clothes? reflections on the ideo-
logical evolution of the British National Party 1999–2006. Patterns of Prejudice,
41 (1), 61 - 82.
DAC. (2009, November). Manual for drought management (Government Report).
Department of Agriculture and Cooperation, Ministry of Agriculture, Government
of India.
DAC&FW. (2016, December). Manual for drought management (Government Re-
port). Department of Agriculture, Cooperation & Farmers Welfare, Ministry of
Agriculture and Farmers Welfare, Government of India.
123
DAC&FW. (2017, November). Drought management plan (Government Report).
Department of Agriculture, Cooperation & Farmers Welfare, Ministry of Agricul-
ture and Farmers Welfare, Government of India.
DAC&FW. (2018, May). Ammendment to the drought manual (Government Re-
port). Drought Management Division, Department of Agriculture, Cooperation
& Farmers Welfare, Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare, Government of
India.
DAC&FW. (2020). Crop production statistics for selected states, crops and range of
year (Government Report). Department of Agriculture, Cooperation & Farmers
Welfare, Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare, Government of India.
DAC&FW. (2021). Web based land use statistical information system (Government
Report). Department of Agriculture, Cooperation & Farmers Welfare, Ministry of
Agriculture and Farmers Welfare, Government of India.
Didan, K. (2015). MOD13A2 MODIS/terra vegetation indices 16-day l3 global 1km
sin grid v006 (Dataset). NASA EOSDIS Land Processes DAAC.
Dixit, A., & Londregan, J. (1996). The determinants of success of special interests
in redistributive politics. The Journal of Politics , 58 (4), 1132–1155. Retrieved
from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2960152
Downton, M. W., & Pielke, R. A., Jr. (2001). Discretion without accountability:
politics, flood damage, and climate. Natural Hazards Review , 2 (4), 157-166.
Election Commission of India. (1976, December). The delimitation of parliamentary
and assembly constituencies order, 1976 (Tech. Rep.).
Election Commission of India. (2008, November). The delimitation of parliamentary
and assembly constituencies order, 2008 (Tech. Rep.).
Election Commission of India. (2019). Statistical Reports of general election to the
state legislative assembly (Vidhansabha). Retrieved from https://eci.gov.in/
statistical-report/statistical-reports/
Finan, F., & Mazzocco, M. (2020, August). Electoral incentives and the allocation
of public funds (Working Paper).
Fisman, R., Schulz, F., & Vig, V. (2019). Financial disclosure and political selection:
Evidence from India (Working Paper).
Ford, R., & Goodwin, M. (2014). What’s the difference between BNP and UKIP
voters? The Guardian.
124
Garrett, T. A., & Sobel, R. S. (2003). The political economy of FEMA disas-
ter payments. Economic Inquiry , 41 (3), 496-509. Retrieved from https://
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1093/ei/cbg023 doi: 10.1093/ei/
cbg023
George, S. (2020). Like father, like son? the economic effects of political dynasties
(Working Paper).
GoAP. (2013, January). Disaster management - drought 2012 - declaration of 234
mandals as drought affected in the state during south west monsoon 2012 - orders
- issued. (Government Document). Government of Andhra Pradesh.
GoK. (2016, October). Declaration of certain taluks of State has drought affected
during 2016-17. (Government Document). Government of Karnataka.
GoK. (2018, October). Memorandum submitted to Government of India seeking
financial assistance for drought mitigation measures in Karnataka during Kharif
2018 (Government Report). Department of Revenue (Disaster Management),
Government of Karantaka.
Golden, M., & Min, B. (2013). Distributive politics around the world. Annual
Review of Political Science, 16 (1), 73-99. Retrieved from https://doi.org/
10.1146/annurev-polisci-052209-121553 doi: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-052209
-121553
Gray, C., & Mueller, V. (2012). Drought and population mobility in rural Ethiopia.
World development , 40 (1), 134–145.
Gupta, B., & Mukhopadhyay, A. (2016). Local funds and political competition:
Evidence from the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in India. Eu-
ropean Journal of Political Economy , 41 , 14 - 30. Retrieved from http://www
.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268015000932 doi: https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.10.009
Imai, K., & Kim, I. S. (2019). When should we use unit fixed effects regression
models for causal inference with longitudinal data? American Journal of Political
Science, 63 (2), 467-490.
IPCC. (2012). Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate
change adaption. (A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V. Barros, T.F. Stocker, D. Qin,
D.J. Dokken, K.L. Ebi, M.D. Mastrandrea, K.J. Mach, G.-K. Plattner, S.K. Allen,
M. Tignor, and P.M. Midgley (eds.)].) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
UK, and New York, NY, USA.
125
Iyer, L., & Reddy, M. (2013). Redrawing the lines: Did political incumbents influence
electoral redistricting in the world’s largest democracy? (Working Paper 14-051).
Harvard Business School.
Kazianga, H., & Udry, C. (2006). Consumption smoothing? livestock, insurance and
drought in rural Burkina Faso. Journal of Development Economics , 79 (2), 413
- 446. Retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S030438780600006X (Special Issue in honor of Pranab Bardhan) doi: https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.01.011
Kinsey, B., Burger, K., & Gunning, J. W. (1998). Coping with drought in Zimbabwe:
Survey evidence on responses of rural households to risk. World Development ,
26 (1), 89-110.
Li, X., Zhou, Y., Zhao, M., & Zhao, X. (2020, Jan). Harmonization of DMSP
and VIIRS nighttime light data from 1992-2018 at the global scale. figshare. doi:
10.6084/m9.figshare.9828827.v2
Lindbeck, A., & Weibull, J. W. (1987). Balanced-budget redistribution as the
outcome of political competition. Public Choice, 52 (3), 273–297. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30024725
Linden, L. (2004). Are incumbents always advantaged? the preference for non-
incumbents in India (Working Paper).
Longhurst, J., Tromans, N., & Young, C. (2007). Statistical disclosure control for
the 2011 UK census (Tech. Rep.). ONS.
Mahadevan, M. (2021, February). The price of power: Costs of political corruption
in Indian electricity (Working Paper).
Massey, D. S., & Denton, N. A. (1988). The dimensions of residential segregation.
Social Forces , 67 (2), 281-315. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/
2579183
Mookherjee, D. (2015). Political decentralization. Annual Reviews of Economics ,
231-249.
Mookherjee, D., & Nath, A. (2020, October). Clientelistic politics and pro-poor
targeting: Rules versus discretionary budgets (Working Paper).
NSSO. (2014, December). Key indicators of situation of agricultural households in
India: NSS 70th Round (January-December 2013) (Government Report). National
Sample Survey Office, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Gov-
ernment of India. Retrieved from http://mospi.nic.in/sites/default/files/
publication reports/KI 70 33 19dec14.pdf
126
NWIC. (2020). Districtwise ground water level (in m.) report (all agencies) (Gov-
ernment Report). National Water Informatics Centre, Department of Water Re-
sources, River Development & Ganga Rejuvenation, Ministry of Jal Shakti, Gov-
ernment of India.
Oliver, A. J., & Reeves, A. (2015). The politics of disaster relief. In Emerg-
ing trends in the social and behavioral sciences (p. 1-8). American Cancer So-
ciety. Retrieved from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/
9781118900772.etrds0258 doi: 10.1002/9781118900772.etrds0258
Oliver, J. E., & Wong, J. (2003). Intergroup prejudice in multiethnic settings.
American Journal of Political Science, 47 (4), 567–582.
Pai, D., Sridhar, L., Rajeevan, M., Sreejith, O., Satbhai, N., & Mukhopadhyay, B.
(2014, January). Development of a new high spatial resolution (0.25◦x0.25◦) long
period (1901−2010) daily gridded rainfall data set over India and its comparison
with existing data sets over the region. MAUSAM , 65 , 1-18.
Pettigrew, T. F. (1998). Intergroup contact theory. Annual review of psychology ,
49 (1), 65-85.
Pidd, H. (2018, May). As the BNP vanishes, do the forces that built it remain? The
Guardian.
Poovanna, S. (2016, October). Karnataka govt declares 42 more talukas
drought-affected. Livemint . Retrieved from https://www.livemint.com/
Politics/IMsH6HjxQUOtnE5lzyltPK/Karnataka-govt-declares-42-more
-talukas-droughtaffected.html
Ranson, M., Tarquinio, L., & Lew, A. (2016, May). Modeling the impact of climate
change on extreme weather losses (Working Paper No. 2016-02). National Center
for Environmental Economics.
Rathore, M. (2005). State level analysis of drought policies and impacts in Rajasthan,
India (Working Paper No. 93). International Water Management Institute.
Reddy, L. V. R. (2016, May). Telangana muffed up its drought list; lo-




Sarkar, S. (2019, March). Votes and policies: Evidence from close elections in India
(Working Paper).
Sen, A. (2000). Development as freedom. New York, NY: Anchor Books.
127
Shaukat, M. (2019, May). Too close to call: Electoral competition and politician
behavior in India (Working Paper).
Shenoy, A., & Zimmermann, L. (2020, July). Political organizations and persistent
policy distortions (Working Paper).
Singh, A., Park, A., & Dercon, S. (2015, March). School meals as a safety net:
an evaluation of the midday meal scheme in India. Journal of Development Eco-
nomics , 113 , 16-32.
Stanke, C., Kerac, M., Prudhomme, C., Medlock, J., & Murray, V. (2013, June).
Health effects of drought: a systematic review of the evidence. PLOS Currents
Disasters , 5 (1).
Steinmayr, A. (2016, March). Exposure to Refugees and Voting for the Far-Right:
(Unexpected) Results from Austria (IZA Discussion Papers No. 9790). Institute
of Labor Economics (IZA). Retrieved from https://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/
izadps/dp9790.html
Tabellini, M. (2020). Gifts of the immigrants, woes of the natives: Lessons from the
age of mass migration. Review of Economic Studies , 87 , 454-486.
UNDP. (2002, June). A climate risk management approach to disaster reduction
and adaptation to climate change (Tech. Rep.). United Nations Development
Programme.
van den Dool, H., Huang, J., & Fan, Y. (2003). Performance and analysis of
the constructed analogue method applied to US soil moisture applied over 1981-
2001. Journal of Geophysical Research, 108 , 1-16. Retrieved from https://
www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/
van der Waal, J., de Koster, W., & Achterberg, P. (2013). Ethnic segregation and
radical right-wing voting in Dutch cities. Urban Affairs Review , 49 (5), 748-777.
doi: 10.1177/1078087412473067
Ward, H., & John, P. (1999). Targeting benefits for electoral gain: Constituency
marginality and the distribution of grants to English Local Authorities. Politi-
cal Studies , 47 (1), 32-52. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248
.00186 doi: 10.1111/1467-9248.00186
Wodak, R. (2015). The politics of fear: What right-wing populist discourses mean.
Sage.
Wood, C., & Finlay, W. M. L. (2008). British National Party representations of
Muslims in the month after the London bombings: Homogeneity, threat, and the
conspiracy tradition. British Journal of Social Psychology , 47 (4), 707 - 726.
128
CURRICULUM VITAE
129
130
131
